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This dissertation explores when legislators in weak party systems will use mayors as brokers in order
to provide club goods to citizens. I argue that mayors have the potential to be effective brokers because of
their knowledge of local citizens and conditions, as well as their ability to create networks. In three articles, I
explore when legislators will select mayors as brokers, how to estimate the extent to which mayors invest
in their own clientelist networks, and whether mayors with larger clientelist networks are more likely to be
selected as brokers who deliver club goods benefits.
The first chapter explores when legislators are likely to use mayors as brokers. I use a signaling model
in order to generate predictions about when mayors are most likely to attribute credit to legislators for club
goods. Attributing credit is an essential feature of a reliable broker. I argue that ambitious mayors are more
likely to attribute credit to legislators and find the conditions where a legislators are able to identify ambitious
mayors and when a legislator will provide club goods despite the uncertainty over the type of mayor. I explore
the equilibria from the signaling model using interview data collected in Colombia from 2016-2018.
The second chapter addresses a major methodological limitation for testing the equilibrium solution
from chapter one- that there is no clear measurement of the cost mayors will pay to signal their potential as a
broker. In chapter one, I argue that mayors will pay a cost of building their own network in order to signal
that they are ambitious and can better serve as brokers. In the second chapter, I explore one way to measure
this cost by generating an estimate of patronage at the local level. Patronage is a costly clientelist strategy
that mayors can use to build and maintain their networks. I use a Bayesian Mixed-Membership Model to
estimate the use of patronage, and I validate this model using both qualitative data and survey data from the
Latin American Public Opinion Project.
Finally, the third chapter explores whether municipalities where mayors have build larger clientelist
networks are more likely to receive additional transfers from the central government. Using the intuition
of the pooling equilibrium result from chapter one, where mayors will always invest in building networks
iii
to signal their potential as brokers, I argue that mayors who use more patronage in the public service are
likely to receive more discretionary transfers from the central government. I use my estimates of patronage
from chapter two to test my theory on three types of discretionary transfers: discretionary royalties transfers,
number of contracted projects, and the value of contracted projects. I find that mayors with larger patronage
networks receive more transfers, even when controlling for the level of material need in each municipality.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
My research is motivated by a central question: how do governments determine where to allocate
resources? One of the central functions of government is allocating resources to different projects that can
benefit citizens. How these decisions get made, however, is a complicated process that requires coordination
between various political actors, negotiation between competing voices, and sensitivity towards budget
constraints. These decisions are further complicated by electoral incentives: in order to be part of the
conversation about resource allocation, politicians need to be able to win elections.
In this dissertation, I ask how politicians allocate resources in order to win reelections. In particular,
I focus on how national politicians use club goods, or excludable public goods, in order to target specific
voters. Club goods are an important type of resource allocations for several reasons. First, club goods are
meaningful benefits that can help improve infrastructure or access to other social services. Second, club
goods are excludable and politicians can use them in order to reach specific subsets of the population. For
example, a club good can be a water treatment facility that provides a tangible benefit to citizens in that
geographic area, but does not contribute to water improvements outside of that area. Finally, club goods are
part of a profile of strategies politicians can use to reach voters. They are not just politics between elections,
but rather can be used as part of broader campaigning techniques that occupy the space between public and
private goods. As a result, they allow politicians to use more targeted techniques when they do not have the
capacity for more micro-level clientelist targeting.
In the following three papers, I explore how club goods can be used as a clientelist electoral strategy in
weak party contexts. Unlike more micro-level clientelist benefits, like direct cash benefits or jobs through
patronage that are directed towards individuals, club goods target groups of voters who occupy the same
geographic space. However, these strategies still can depend on brokers who help determine how to distribute
benefits. Where political parties are strong, clientelist strategies, including club goods, often rely on a partisan
broker selected by political parties that can be trusted to be loyal to the political party. However, in weak
party systems, political parties lack the capacity to coordinate clientelist networks. Moreover, low levels of
party-discipline suggest that party labels are not meaningful signals of whether a potential broker will be
loyal. While each of these papers stands alone, they all explore how national-level politicians in weak party
contexts select potential clientelist brokers to help the national politician translate club goods benefits into
votes.
In the first paper, I ask when mayors will be reliable brokers for national level politicians. In this paper, I
introduce the idea that mayors have different incentives for attributing credit to legislators, and thus serving
as reliable brokers, or claiming credit for themselves based on their long-term career ambitions. I argue
that ambitious mayors who one day hope to run for higher office are more likely to serve as reliable brokers
because they receive a higher benefit from a new club good in their municipality than non-ambitious mayors
who hope to stay in office. I use a signaling game in order to model the interactions between mayors and
legislators and derive implications about when mayors will signal that they are ambitious, by investing in
costly network-building strategies, in order to be chosen as potential brokers. I find that there exists a pooling
equilibrium where both types of mayors will invest in building networks in order to receive benefits and a
separating equilibrium that suggests conditions where a legislator can use network building as an informative
signal for which type of mayor exists in a municipality. I analyze how these equilibria results appear in
practice using interview data from the Antioquia and Valle de Cauca departments of Colombia
In the second paper, I focus on one of the strategies that mayors can use to build local networks- patronage.
One of the central challenges to empirically testing the model from the first article is that we do not have
a measure that can capture how much a politician invests in building a network. This is because building
political networks is a costly endeavor including strategies both during campaigns and activities while a
politician is in office. I argue that one meaningful signal of local network capacity is a politicians ability to
sustain a loyal clientelist network where citizens will vote for the politician who provides benefits. However,
due to the nature of clientelist exchanges, there is no empirical data on the use of clientelism in any area. In
this paper, I propose using a Bayesian Mixed-Membership Model in order to estimate the use of patronage,
one particular type of clientelism, at the municipal level. Using data about public service hiring practices
in municipalities across Colombia in 2013, I estimate to what extent political considerations factor into
hiring decisions. I validate this measurement strategy using qualitative data and survey data from the Latin
American Public Opinion Project in 2012, 2013, and 2014.
In the final paper, I ask where legislators are most likely to use club goods. I use my own estimate of
patronage at the local level as a proxy for a costly investment in network building in order to test the pooling
equilibrium result from the first paper, where both types of mayors will invest in building political networks
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in order to receive club goods benefits. I argue that when a mayor invests in their own patronage network,
they are more likely to be used as brokers and receive benefits from the national government. I use data
on various types of transfers from the national government and find that mayors who have larger networks
receive more goods, all else equal.
Taken together, these papers provide important insight into the link between politicians building their
own patronage networks and modalities of club goods benefits. I find that mayors’ investment in building
strong voter networks is often rewarded with club goods. This suggests a potential explanation for how
local-level clientelism persists even when institutional reforms, such as non-consecutive terms, could curb its
electoral benefits. If local-level clientelism can help signal broker competency, mayors may have alternative
incentives to use clientelism in order to help their municipality receive goods. Moreover, this suggests a
path forward for research on why citizens continue to elect clientelist politicians, even when these citizens
complain about the politician’s clientelist practices. If a clientelist politician can form better relationships
with the national government, then it may be rational for citizens to seek out this type of local politician.
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CHAPTER 2: WHEN DO CLUB GOODS BUY VOTES? MAYORAL COOPERATION IN CLIEN-
TELIST EXCHANGES
In weak party systems, politicians using clientelist strategies are tasked with the challenge of finding their
own brokers in order to help them reach citizens. How do these politicians, who cannot use party identity
as an information shortcut to help them select brokers, determine who will reliably help deliver votes? In
this paper, I specifically analyze when legislators will use mayors as brokers when distributing club goods
benefits. Mayors can serve as effective brokers because of their relationships with voters and knowledge of
local conditions, but they may also have incentives to claim credit for club goods rather than use these benefits
to help deliver votes for the legislator. In this paper, I use a signaling model in order to determine when it is
rational for legislators to use mayors as brokers, despite the inherent risk in selecting politicians with their
own incentives.Mayors use their own preexisting voter networks to signal whether they have ambition to
run for higher office in the future. The national legislator will then decide whether or not to use the mayor
as a broker by providing a benefit. I find that when the cost of network-building is low, there is a pooling
equilibrium where all mayors will send a signal that they are ambitious, but at slightly higher costs, there is a
separating equilibrium where the legislator can identify ambitious mayors.
2.1 Introduction
In democracies where politicians regularly use clientelist strategies to target citizens, politicians rely on
brokers, or intermediaries, to help build stable clientelist networks. This is particularly true for national
politicians who need to reach voters across a large geographic area that often extends beyond their own
personal network. In traditional theories of clientelism, politicians decide to target voters using particular
goods such as money, material goods, or jobs. However, it is the brokers who are responsible for the details
of clientelist exchanges. Brokers decide which voters receive benefits, the best strategy for distributing those
benefits to voters, and how to monitor the voters to make sure they uphold their end of the clientelist exchange.
In democracies around the world, this central relationship between a politician and their broker is tantamount
in determining the efficacy of clientelist exchanges.
Generally, studies of clientelism consider the party machine as the main driver of clientelism (Kitschelt &
Wilkinson 2007, Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno & Brusco 2013). When brokers and politicians are copartisans,
the broker is expected to deliver votes because of their loyalty to the party and its platform, and because the
party can easily penalize a defector’s reputation within the political party (Holland & Palmer-Rubin 2015,
Mazzalay, Nazareno & Cingolani 2017). However, in much of the developing world, there has been a decline
in the strength of political parties. In these contexts, many politicians need to rely on independent brokers
since political parties lack the capacity to select and monitor partisan brokers. Independent brokers may be
more difficult to incentivize and to punish since they can sell their services to the politician who offers them
the most benefits (Camp 2017, Novaes 2018). Furthermore, in weak party contexts, citizens tend to have lower
levels of partisanship which forces legislators and brokers alike to work in a low-information environment.
This simultaneously reduces the reliance on parties and increases the necessity of identifying brokers who
can, and will, deliver votes (Dargent & Muñoz 2011, Novaes 2014, Holland & Palmer-Rubin 2015).
How, then, do national-level politicians select local-level brokers who are likely to deliver voters?1
While little is known about why brokers cooperate in clientelist exchanges, we know that voters deliver
votes to politicians who provide particularistic benefits for two main reasons: structural conditions, or the
belief that they are being monitored and that there will be repercussions if they do not fulfill their end of
the clientelist bargain, and psychological norms of reciprocity, where citizens feel compelled to “repay”
the politician who helps them (Lawson & Greene 2014). In this paper, I extend this logic to brokers and
argue that independent brokers have similar motivations as non-partisan citizens. On the one hand, structural
conditions will disincentivize brokers from defecting from their agreements with the politician. On the other
hand, norms of reciprocity will encourage independent brokers to stay loyal to the politicians that help them.
I argue that independent brokers will need to anticipate future interactions with the politician in order to
believe that they can be punished for defecting. Similarly, I argue that brokers will only be concerned about
norms of reciprocity when the ongoing rewards from repeated interactions with the politician outweigh the
short-term benefits of selling their services to the politician willing to provide the largest benefit.
I argue that local-level politicians are particularly attractive brokers for national politicians because they
have unique information and insights about their municipality’s voters. Since local politicians have won
their own political campaigns, they know what types of benefits can be effective for their voters and already
1Henceforth, politicians will refer to national-level politicians who have been elected to the legislature while brokers
will refer to local level actors who can mobilize networks of voters to support the politician.
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have a network of voters to deliver. However, selecting local politicians as brokers creates a new issue. As
elected officials, local politicians have their own incentives to claim credit for the clientelist benefits provided
by national politicians. Consequently, when national politicians select local politicians as brokers, these
brokers are also working to build and maintain their own relationships with voters. In this circumstance,
the broker who fails to deliver votes receives a personal benefit in addition to the goods they have extracted
from a national politician. Thus, the risk of a broker defecting and claiming credit for clientelist benefits is
particularly salient. I argue that when brokers are local-level politicians, they will only cooperate when the
national-level politician is able to promise a greater future benefit than the immediate pay-off they receive
from credit-claiming.
When considering how the structural conditions and the norms of reciprocity encourage non-partisan
brokers to stay loyal to national-level politicians, I introduce the idea of political ambition. I define political
ambition broadly as the desire to run for a higher-level political office. So, if a municipal-level politician
expresses interests in running for a regional-level office, this politician is exhibiting political ambition.
However, if the municipal-level politician hopes to continue serving in municipal-level offices, they are not
exhibiting political ambition. Ambition is an important factor to consider in assessing brokers because it
is likely to affect how potential brokers respond to incentives from national-level politicians. The role of
ambition is two-fold: an ambitious local-level politician can be more incentivized by the mere act of receiving
a benefit that will please their constituents and less incentivized by receiving credit because of their need
to expand their network beyond their municipality and prioritize their relationship with other politicians.
A non-ambitious politician may be more motivated to invest in their local network and value credit from
their constituents since their political ambitions are constrained to their own local government. Therefore,
introducing ambition to any explanation for when a local-level politician is likely to be a reliable politician
provides new insights on why we see such variation in a local politician’s likelihood of delivering votes.
In order to analyze the relationship between national-level politicians and independent brokers in weak
party contexts, I conducted field research in Colombia. In Colombia, clientelism is a widely used strategy
even though political parties have limited capacity to control clientelist machines and most citizens do not
identify with a political party. Building on my field research, I use a formal signaling model to isolate
the relationship between the legislator and local-level politicians acting as independent brokers. I use the
model to generate expectations about how legislators will provide benefits through local brokers in order to
minimize their political risk. I focus explicitly on the case where the broker is a mayor in order to model
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the broker’s benefit for credit-claiming. Based on the solution to the signaling model, I find that mayors
who have aspirations for higher-level political office will attribute credit to legislators for larger clientelist
benefits than non-ambitious mayors. Furthermore, I find that when benefits are relatively small and the cost
of signaling ambition is moderate, the ambitions mayor is more likely to pay the cost of signaling ambition
than the non-ambitious mayor. This is particularly noteworthy because it makes it possible for a national
politician to distinguish ambitious mayors who are likely to provide credit for benefits from non-ambitions
mayors who will claim credit for themselves. These findings suggest that legislators will not maximize their
transfers in order to reach voters, but rather will moderate what transfers they provide to maximize their
likelihood to receiving credit from voters.
My research contributes to our understanding of why independent brokers are loyal to clientelist politi-
cians. Given the high number of clientelist politicians that cannot rely on party brokers, knowing when
independent brokers are most likely to deliver votes helps us understand both why national politicians provide
the benefits they do and when these benefits are likely to improve national politicians’ vote share. Moreover,
understanding which mayors are likely to behave as reliable brokers has effects on whether local politicians
are accountable to voters or to other politicians. Who politicians are accountable to shapes the types of
politicians who may be most attractive to voters and can shape our understanding of how voters select
local-level politicians. By focusing on the case where the independent broker is a mayor, my research is
also able to help explain when national politicians are able to incentivize brokers who have particularly large
incentives to defect from clientelist agreements and claim credit for themselves.
2.2 Exchanging Club Goods: The Case of Colombia
Colombia is an excellent case for understanding legislator’s decision calculus when selecting independent
brokers. In Colombia, the problem of weak party machines is two-fold. First, after the 1991 Constitution,
Colombia experienced party fragmentation leading to multiple parties occupying the same ideological space.
While reforms in 2003 helped tackle the problem of party switching, mayors, bureaucrats, and legislators
agree that political parties have exceptionally limited power. As one legislator explained, in Colombia “the
party is merely a name on a list.”2 The parties do not contribute to political campaigns, and thus have very
little control over whether party members chose to use clientelist linkages. Second, in Colombia, citizens
2Interview conducted November 2018
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are largely non-partisan. While many identify as supporters of specific candidates, such as former president
Álvaro Uribe, very few have clear partisan attachments. Thus, any broker is limited in their ability to use
parties as an informational shortcut when determining how to target citizens.
Despite this, legislators continue to use club goods as clientelist benefits in order to target voters. Club
goods, or excludable public goods, can take a variety of forms– including projects ranging from new roads
connecting isolated communities to the town centers to new medical clinics serving small villages. Club
goods are still used by legislators because they can be targeted towards particular areas for specific voters.
When it is not feasible to use micro-level targeting through direct cash transfers or patronage, club goods
provide a way for national politicians to reach a broader group of voters in order to minimize the consequences
of any singular voter defecting from the clientelist bargain. Moreover, citizens concerned with the normative
implications of more direct targeting are less likely to object to club goods.
In Colombia, the most common means to distribute club goods is through “cupos indicativos”, also
referred to as “jam”. This is a central feature to Colombian clientelism, where many legislators, mayors,
and bureaucrats refer to jam as the “grease in the wheels of Colombian politics”.3 The process of receiving
jam is direct: a legislator has a particular good that they’d like to provide to a municipality and the ability to
secure those funds through the necessary national ministries (La Silla Vacı́a 2018). For a legislator, providing
goods is a strategy for reaching voters. For ministers, providing goods allows the ministry to show that
it has invested in relevant projects. For example, a legislator can hope to build a soccer field with their
access to funds from the recreation department or a new wing on a hospital with their access to funds from
the health ministry. The legislator contacts a mayor who is central to their network, usually a member of
their department, to act as a broker and offers to invest in the project. The mayor agrees and the money is
transferred. Very rarely will a mayor decline a project funded through jam. According to mayors interviewed,
access to these funds is a crucial form of investment. While many mayors decry the practice as corrupt, they
argue that it’s a necessary corruption that improves local conditions, improves relationships across levels of
government, and helps both actors politically. Newspapers and citizens alike complain that jam needs to be
reformed, but they agree that it is a prominent strategy that Colombian legislators use to cultivate votes.
Mayors, therefore, have access to additional benefits if they are a member of that politicians’ network.
National politicians, who need allies in order to reach voters across a large geographic area, will build
3Interview conducted July 2018
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political networks in order to help them reach voters. For a mayor, being a member of a national politician’s
network creates a web of political allies across party lines and improves access to benefits since it increases
the likelihood that mayor will receive jam benefits. Where political parties cannot help connect politicians,
independent networks can form a similar function.
In interviews, no subjects explained exactly how legislators determine which mayors are central to their
network and are likely to receive jam. However, bureaucrats emphasized that the mayors who receive jam
are those who are able to maintain ongoing relationships with the legislators.4 In this article, I propose an
explanation for how legislators determine who receives club good benefits. Rather than trying to provide
benefits broadly to maximize the voters reached, I argue that legislators will moderate their use of club goods
so that they receive credit for providing goods and can build more loyal political networks. I expect that
mayors are more likely to receive jam when they have shown that they expect to stay in the political-system
long-term. Mayors will choose to invest in building a network that suggests ambition when the club goods
benefits are particularly desirable. I argue that ambitious mayors who need to maintain voter networks and
expand their reach are more likely to be central to a legislators network.
For legislators, jam is an important tool for reelection since it allows them to reach a large range of voters.
However, in order to translate funds into new projects that can help them win votes, they need the support of
a broker that can help them decide where the project can do they most good and, most importantly, make
sure that voters know the legislator deserves credit for new projects. However, since both ambitious and
non-ambitious mayors alike can personally benefit from jam in local elections, legislators are faced with a
clear principal-agent problem. Legislators need mayors as brokers, but they only benefit from using the jam
system when the mayors are reliable brokers that help legislators translate benefits provided through jam into
votes. Otherwise, jam is a costly investment with minimal returns.
Legislators have access to limited funds through their relationships with ministers. In order to decide how
to allocate these funds to maximize their own potential returns, they need to trust that voters will know who
provides the goods. Selecting the brokers who will do this is especially difficult since mayors are also chosen
through elections, and thus have incentives to receive credit from voters. The pressure to select brokers who
will willingly attribute credit is crucial given that, in federal states, citizens have trouble identifying which
4Interviews conducted in October 2018
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level of government is responsible for different local projects (Roberts & Wibbels 1999). This is true even
when considering unitary states with extensive decentralization reforms, like Colombia.
In Colombia, extensive administration decentralization highlights the challenges faced by legislators who
need to receive credit for the goods they provide. For example, health and education are funded by the national
government, but mayors implement the projects. I ran an original survey of over 2000 citizens in Colombia
randomizing if they were asked about which political actors deserve credit for road maintenance, water and
sewage, schools, hospitals, parks, or electricity. When asked about whether the president, congress, governors,
department legislatures, mayors, or town councils fund specific initiatives, only 14.41% correctly identified
Congress as the level of government that funds hospitals. Meanwhile, 16.23 % of respondents believed the
mayor paid for this initiative. Similarly, of the group asked about education, 9.17% correctly identified the
legislature as responsible for funding schools while 22.49% believed the mayors were responsible. Citizens
have trouble assigning credit when there is a clearly defined division between paying for and implementing
projects. When considering other categories, where the roles are less clearly defined, citizens are consistently
more likely to see the mayor as more responsible for financing local projects than legislators. Receiving
credit for club goods is not only desired, it is essential for legislators who hope these goods will help them
win elections.
Mayors benefit from the assumption that they are responsible for providing local goods. Thus, attributing
credit to national legislators is not immediately appealing because it communicates with citizens that someone
outside the municipality was actually responsible for any development within the municipality. Mayors
who want to maintain a strong reputation with their local constituents benefit from receiving credit for
projects funded using jam. Across interviews, mayors repeatedly exclaimed, “I successfully brought projects
to my municipality”5, even when these mayors conceded to using their relationships with legislators to
fund the projects. Moreover, mayors consistently lamented the challenges in receiving additional funds for
their municipality, expressing the importance that citizens understand just how hard they work to bring in
funds. However, other local-level political officials treated credit attribution as part of a long-term strategy,
explaining, “you need to provide votes for the legislators, and then they make sure you have what you need.
And you keep providing votes, and it lets you advance in their network. Everyone has a network, and you
5Interviews Conducted July 2018-December 2018
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have to advance to win”. I explore the trade offs associated with attributing credit to projects and providing
jam benefits using a signaling model.
2.3 A Signaling Model of Brokerage
In order to analyze when mayors will assign credit to legislators for club goods within a municipality, I focus
on a candidate-centered model of the interactions between elected officials across levels of government. This
model explicitly omits the presence of a political party with its own interests since I am focused on weak party
contexts. When political parties are weak, legislators are responsible for determining their own independent
brokers and cannot rely on a party to help select partisan brokers (Holland & Palmer-Rubin 2015). The
intuition of the model stems from each actors optimal preferences.
National legislators prefer to provide goods efficiently. That is, the national legislator wants to provide
goods to mayors who have stable blocks of voters that they can mobilize in order to support the legislator.
These mayors are likely to act as effective brokers because they can use their information about local
constituents in order to provide club goods that are most likely to increase a voters support of a politician.
However, a legislator will only benefit from using this type of mayor as a broker if the mayor is willing to
attribute credit to national legislators for the new goods in a given municipality.
Not all mayors are likely to act as reliable brokers. For this model, I argue that there are two types of
mayors with different preferences that affect the mayor’s optimal decision. The first is the “ambitious” mayor
who aspires for higher office and benefits from building a personal network with the national politician. This
mayor receives a higher benefit from being within a national politicians network than the not-ambitious mayor
due to their own long-term political goals. The second is the “not ambitious” mayor. This mayor may hope to
stay in local-level politics, and thus receives a higher benefit from showing their local constituents how much
they do for the municipality itself. As a result, they do not have equally strong incentives to prioritize their
relationship with national politicians over their immediate payoff for voters. This mayor will care less about
their future with the legislator because their immediate payoff from local voters is more pressing than the
uncertain future with the national government.
I model the interactions between the national legislator and the mayor using a signaling game. First,
nature decides whether a mayor is the “ambitious” type of the “not ambitious” type. A mayor is an ambitious
type with a probability, p. The mayor’s type determines the mayor’s preferences. Then, the mayor determines
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whether to send a signal that they6 have invested in network building. The network building signal suggests
that a mayor is ambitious because they have paid the cost of long-term political investment. This signal can
include investing in clientelistic exchanges with voters. Conversely, the absence of a signal implies that the
mayor is not engaged in network-building between electoral cycles. In the absence of a signal, a mayor may
maintain their popularity through personal charisma or hope that their performance will establish a reputation.
The national legislator, who prefers to target stable constituencies, observes the network-building signal as a
potential indicator of the mayors desire to continue serving in politics long-term. After observing the signal,
the national legislator decides whether to provide a benefit of size, k. Finally, a mayor determines whether
to “attribute credit”, or give credit to the national politician for the benefit, or “claim credit” and assert their
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Figure 2.1: Signaling Game
The utility functions for legislators and the ambitious and non-ambitious mayors are a function of the
size of a club good benefit, k, a multiplicative benefit, σ, for receiving credit for a club good, and a base
6When discussing both mayors and legislators, they is used as a gender-neutral singular pronoun
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Parameter Definition Range of Values
k Size of the benefit provided ∈ [0, 1]
σ Additional benefit of receiving credit > 1
α Base payoff for receiving a benefit ∈ (0, 1)
c Cost of network building > 0
Ic Indicator for receiving credit {0, 1}
Is Indicator for sending the network signal {0, 1}
N Subscript referring to the national government
L Subscript referring to a low value
H Subscript referring to a high value
Table 2.1: Model Parameters
benefit, α, that is a proportion of the size of the benefit and that a mayor receives for being chosen as a broker.
There is no parameter for reelection. Instead, a potential reelection benefit is accrued as part of the base
payoff for receiving the benefit, α and the additional payoff for receiving credit, σ. It follows that if a mayor
has a high α and σ value, they are more likely to be reelected. Table 2.1 define each of these parameters and
their components.
The national legislator’s utilities are a function of whether or not they receive credit and the size of the
club good they provided. The legislator’s utility is k(IcσN − 1) In this utility function, Ic is an indicator
function that determines whether the legislator has received credit. If they do, then the legislator receives the
multiplicative benefit for receiving credit, less the cost of providing the benefit. If they do not, they simply
pay the cost of providing the benefit.
The mayor’s utility functions are a function of their benefit for receiving credit and their base payoff
for receiving the benefit. If a mayor sends a network building signal, they pay an additional cost, c. The
mayor’s utility is k(Icσ + α) − Ic1 − Isc. In this function, Ic is the indicator that is one if the legislator
received credit, and 0 otherwise while Is is the indicator for whether the mayor sent the network-building
signal. The mayor who claims credit will receive the additional benefit, σ, that is a function of the size of the
good. However, this mayor will have to pay a normalized cost, 1, of jeopardizing their reputation with the
national politician. This cost for claiming credit is the loss that a mayor has for no longer being a member of
a politician’s network, and thus losing potential future benefits and political allies within that network.
Since the ambitious mayor is concerned about their reputation beyond their own municipality, they value
receiving a benefit, regardless of credit, more than a mayor who is more focused on their local reputation. As
a result, the ambitious mayor will receive a larger benefit α for all potential benefits, k. The ambitious mayor
will always receive αH while the not ambitious mayor will receive αL. Both mayors benefit from receiving
13
club goods benefits, but the ambitious mayor benefits more because they place higher value on being part of
the legislators political network. Likewise, the not ambitious mayor, since they are most focused on their
local reputation, receive a higher benefit, σ, when they receive credit. As a result, the credit benefit for the
ambitious mayor is σL and for the not ambitious mayor is σH . As with receiving benefits, both mayors have
payoffs for receiving credit, but the payoff for the ambitious mayor is lower because they need to build a
broader constituency outside their own municipality. The full utility functions can be seen in Table 2.2
Legislator Strategy Mayor Strategy Legislator Payoff Ambitious Not Ambitious
Mayor Payoff Mayor Payoff
Don’t Provide - 0 −Isc −Isc
Provide k ∈ (0, 1] Attribute credit k(σN − 1) kαH − Isc kαL − Isc
Provide k ∈ (0, 1] Claim Credit −k k(σL + αH)− 1− Isc k(σH + αL)− 1− Isc
Table 2.2: Payoffs
2.3.1 Best Responses
2.3.1.1 Stage 3: Credit Attribution
In the final stage of the game, the mayor decides whether to attribute credit of claim credit. The mayor will
attribute credit only where the utility from attributing credit is greater than the utility from claiming credit for
themselves. For the ambitious mayor, this occurs when k ≤ 1σL . This means that, as long as the contract is
smaller than the inverse of their credit claiming benefit, the mayor will be willing to attribute credit. The
larger the benefit for receiving credit, the smaller the benefit that the mayor is willing to attribute credit for.
The not ambitious mayor will attribute credit when k ≤ 1σH . This means that it is harder for a non-
ambitious mayor to attribute credit since this type of mayor will always receive a larger payoff for receiving
credit than the ambitious mayor. When k > 1σL , neither the ambitious nor the not-ambitious mayors
will attribute credit. When k < 1σH both types of mayors will attribute credit. The third region, where
1
σH
< k ≤ 1σL , is most interesting because in this range of benefits, k, the two types of mayor will behave
differently. In this range, the ambitious mayor will attribute credit while the not ambitious mayor will claim
credit for themselves.7.
7Full proofs can be found in the appendix
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2.3.1.2 Stage 2: Deciding Whether to Provide the Benefit
The legislator will always provide the benefit if they know that they will receive credit. The legislator will
always provide the benefit if k ≤ 1σH . The legislator will never provide the benefit if they will not receive
credit. So, they will never provide the benefit if k > 1σL .
If the benefit k ∈ ( 1σH ,
1
σL
], whether the legislator provides the benefit is a function of their belief, µ, that
the mayor is ambitious. The legislator will provide the benefit if:
µ(k(σN − 1)) + (1− µ)(−k) ≥ 0
µkσN − k ≥ 0
µσN − 1 ≥ 0
µ ≥ 1
σN
The legislator has beliefs, µ for whether they observe the network building signal or whether they do
not observe the network building signal. If the legislator holds a belief, µs, that the mayor who sent the
signal was ambitious. They will provide the benefit if µs ≥ 1σN . If the mayor does not observe the network
building signal, they hold a belief, µ, that the mayor who did not invest in building a network is ambitious.
The legislator will provide a club good benefit if µ ≥ 1σN .
Stage 1: Sending the Ambitious Signal
If the mayor will receive a club good regardless of sending a signal, then the mayor will always prefer not to
send the signal to maximize their own returns and avoid paying the cost, c. However, if sending the signal is
the only way to receive a contract, then the two mayors will only send the signal when the cost of doing so
is sufficiently low. When both mayors attribute credit, or k < 1σH , then the ambitious mayor will send the
signal when c < kαH and the not ambitious mayor will send the signal when c < kαL. In this circumstance,
the ambitious mayor is more likely to pay to send the signal.




mayors have different considerations when deciding whether to pay to send the signal. Since the ambitious
mayor will attribute credit, they will still send the signal whenever c < kαH . The not ambitious mayor, on
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the other hand, will pay to send the signal when the cost of network building is less than their benefit for
claiming credit: c < k(σH + αL)− 1 .
2.4 Equilibria
As seen in stage 3, whether a mayor is a reliable broker depends solely on the size of the benefit, k. An
ambitious mayor will be reliable broker whenever the benefit is less than their additional benefit for receiving
credit, when k ≤ 1σL . For the not ambitious mayor, they will be a reliable broker whenever the benefit is less
than their additional benefit for receiving credit, or k ≤ 1σH . Thus, the legislators optimal decision can be
determined based on the size of the benefit, k, that the legislator can use as a club good.
The legislator has to determine their best response in three separate conditions:
1. k > 1σL , the best response for the legislator is never to provide k because neither type of mayor will be
a reliable broker. Instead, both types of mayor will claim credit for themselves.
2. k ≤ 1σH , the best response for the legislator is always to provide k because both types of mayor will
always be reliable brokers and attribute credit to the legislator.
3. k ∈ ( 1σH ,
1
σL
] the best response for the legislator is a function of their belief that the mayor is ambitious.
The legislator will provide k when their belief, µ, that the mayor is ambitious is at least 1σN
Since the beliefs are irrelevant for best responses if k ≤ 1σH or k >
1
σL
, the interesting range to study
occurs when k ∈ ( 1σH ,
1
σL
]. This case depends on two sets of beliefs, the belief, µs that the mayor who invests
in building a network is ambitious and the belief, µ, that the mayor who does not invest in building a network
is ambitious.
The legislator will only provide a benefit when their belief that the mayor is ambitious is at least 1σN . This
means that, in order for providing a club good benefit to be rational, the legislator must believe the mayor is
ambitious with a probability greater than the inverse of their benefit for receiving credit. The legislator has
four possible strategies in pure strategies.
1. The legislator never provides the benefit, k.
2. The legislator provides the benefit, k, both when they observe the network building signal and when
they do not observe the network building signal.
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3. The legislator does not provide a benefit when they observe the network building signal but does
provide a benefit when they do not observe the network building signal.
4. The legislator provides the benefit when they observe the network building signal and does not provide
the benefit when they do not observe the network building signal.
In the first case, the legislator will never provide the benefit, k, regardless of what signal they observe.
Neither type of mayor will invest in building a network because there is no positive utility for sending the
signal. This case occurs when the legislator believes that the mayor is ambitious with a probability µ < 1σN .
The beliefs are consistent as long as the probability that any mayor is ambitious, p, is less than 1σN . This
equilibrium can occur when the national legislator receives a relatively small payoff for receiving credit. The
smaller the legislator’s payoff for receiving credit, the more discerning they will be about providing benefits
to mayors that might not be reliable brokers.
In the second case, the legislator will always provide the benefit, k, regardless of what signal they observe.
In this case, both types of mayor will not invest in building a network because they can receive the same
payoff from the benefit without paying the cost of sending a signal about their political network. This case
occurs when the legislator believes that the mayor is ambitious with a probability µ > 1sigmaN . The beliefs
are consistent as long as the probability that any mayor is ambitious, p, is greater than 1σN . This equilibrium
can occur when the national legislator receives a relatively high payoff for receiving credit. The larger the
legislator’s payoff for receiving credit, the less discerning they will be about providing benefits to mayors
who may not be reliable brokers.
The strategies for the mayor become more interesting when the legislator bases their actions on observing
a signal about the strength of the mayors network. If the legislator does not provide the benefit when they
observe the network building signal but does provide the benefit when they do not observe the network
building signal, then the mayor will never invest in building a network in order to receive the benefit. This
belief is consistent if the probability, p, that a mayor is ambitious is greater than 1σN and the legislator believes
that ambitious mayors will not invest in building political networks. This equilibrium result, therefore,
depends on how the legislator evaluates mayors incentives. For example, if a legislator thought that a mayor
with national ambitions would not invest in their local network, this equilibrium result could be observed. In
each of these three conditions, there is a pooling equilibrium where neither type of mayor invests in building
a local network.
17
Finally, I consider the case where the legislator provides benefits to mayors who send the network
building signal and does not provide benefits to mayors who do not send the network building signal. If an
ambitious mayor sends the signal, they will claim credit and their payoff will be a proportion of the benefit
they receive, less the cost they paid to send the network building signal, kαH − c. However, if the ambitious
mayor does not send the signal, they will receive a payoff of 0. As a result, the ambitious mayor will send
the signal as long as the cost of sending the signal, c, is less than their benefit from attributing credit, kαH .
On the other hand, the not ambitious mayor will claim credit if they receive the benefit. As a result, the not
ambitious mayor will receive their benefit for receiving credit, less the penalty for being an unreliable broker
and the cost of sending the network building signal, k(σH + αL)− 1− c. If the not ambitious mayor does
not send the signal that they have build a political network, they will receive 0. The not ambitious mayor will
send the signal as long as the cost, c is less than their benefit for claiming credit, k(σH + αL)− 1.
This leads to four cases of interest: one where both mayors will invest in building networks to receive
the benefit, one where only the ambitious mayor is willing to pay the cost of network building, one where
only the not ambitious mayor is willing to pay the cost of network building, and one where neither mayor is
willing to pay the cost of building networks.
If both mayors are willing to pay to send the signal, c ≤ kαH and c ≤ k(σH + αL)− 1
The legislator will only provide the benefit if they believe that the mayor who sends the signal is ambitious








= All Beliefs Consistent
If p ≥ 1σN there exists a pooling equilibrium where both types of mayors send the network building
signal. The legislator will provide the benefit if they observe the signal and will not provide the benefit if
18
they do not observe the signal. The ambitious mayor attributes credit and the not ambitious mayor claims
credit. µs = p and µ < 1σN . This equilibrium result reflects a situations where a legislator treats the network
building signal as informative and the not ambitious mayor will imitate the ambitious mayor so that they can
benefit from being selected as a broker.
If the ambitious mayor pays to send the signal and the not ambitious mayor does not, c ≤ kαH
and c > k(σH + αL)− 1
Here, it is only rational for a legislator to provide benefits after observing the network building signal if
their belief, µs that the mayor who sends the signal is ambitious is greater than 1σN and their belief, µ that the









These beliefs are consistent. So, if c < kαH , and c > k(σH + αL)− 1 there is a separating equilibrium
where the ambitious mayor sends the clientelist signal and the not ambitious mayor does not. The legislator
will provide the good if they observe the signal and will not provide the good if they do not observe the signal.
The ambitious mayor will attribute credit and the not ambitious mayor would claim credit if they sent the
signal. µs = 1 and µ = 0. This equilibrium is possible when k ∈ ( 1σH ,
1
σH−αH−αL ), the point where both
types of mayors will receive the same payoff. This equilibrium result is the ideal for a legislator because it
allows them to select a reliable broker with minimal risk.
If the ambitious mayor does not pay to send the signal and the not ambitious mayor sends the
signal, c > kαH and c ≤ k(σH + αL)− 1
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Again, it is only rational for a legislator to provide the benefit only after observing the signal if µs ≥
frac1σN and µ < 1σN . However, in this case, only the not ambitious mayor pays to send the signal. As a





These beliefs are not consistent and there is no equilibrium.
If neither mayor pays the cost of clientelism,c > kαH and c > k(σH + αL)− 1
In this condition, neither mayor is willing to send the network building signal. However, the legislator’s
strategy is still rational if µs ≥ 1σN and µ <
1
σN










If p < 1σN there is a pooling equilibrium where neither mayor sends the signal, the legislator will provide
the benefit if they observe the signal and will not provide the benefit if they do not observe the signal, and the
mayor would attribute credit if they received the benefit while the not ambitious mayor would claim credit if
they received the benefit. µs ≥ 1σN and µ = p. For this equilibrium to occur, it must be very expensive for a
mayor to invest in building a network.
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2.4.1 Comparative Statics
A mayor will only send the network building signal when the national legislator provides a benefit after
observing the signal and does not provide the benefit if they do not observe the signal. In this condition, the
legislator believes that a mayor who sends the signal is ambitious with a probability ≥ 1σN and believes a
mayor who does not send the signal is ambitious with a probability < 1σN . While this is only one condition,
it occurs quite frequently: mayors regularly explain that they invest in patronage strategies because it helps
them gain resources from the national government.
In this common condition, it is possible to observe three types of equilibria: a pooling equilibrium where
both types of mayors send the signal by investing in network building, a separating equilibrium where only
the ambitious mayor invests in network building, and a pooling equilibrium where neither mayor invests in
network building. The regions can be seen in Figure 2.2.
The model helps to explain when observing the signal informs a legislators decision to provide the
benefit, k. When a legislator chooses to provide the benefit, they are choosing that mayor as their broker. For
any moderately sized benefit k ∈ ( 1σH ,
1
σL
], the ambitious mayor will attribute credit while the not ambitious
mayor will claim credit for themselves. The benefit that the legislator has the ability to provide, therefore,
will determine whether the mayors can be reliable brokers: the ambitious mayor is likely to be reliable, while
the not ambitious mayor is not reliable. The challenge, then, remains: how can the legislator determine
whether they are selecting an ambitious mayor as their broker.
The range of values where it may be possible to separate ambitious and not ambitious mayors depends
on the difference between each mayors additional benefit for receiving credit. If the mayor who is ambitious
has almost the same additional benefit of credit as the not ambitious mayor, which could be the case if a
mayor was not locally popular and needed additional support within their municipality, then there are very
few benefits where network building can behave as an informative signal. However, if the benefit for the not
ambitious mayor of receiving local credit is much larger than the ambitious mayors, as would be the case
if this mayor was particularly worried about their visibility for future reelection or anticipating a difficult
challenger, then the space from 1σH to
1
σL
can represent a large range of benefits. In other words, when
the two types of mayor have similar payoffs for claiming credit, then there is a limited range of benefits















Pooling Equilibrium (both types send signal)

























Legislator provides a benefit, k, only if the mayor sends the network-building signal
Figure 2.2: Equilibrium Space
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However, when there is a benefit, k, that causes the two types of mayors to behave differently, whether
a mayor decides to pay to send the signal depends on the cost, c, of building a network. When the cost of
sending the network building signal is sufficiently low, for example when there is already a strong network in
place or there are a high number of jobs available that can be filled using patronage, then both types of mayors
will invest in building a network. This creates a pooling equilibrium where the legislator cannot ascertain
which type of mayor they are providing a benefit to. When the cost of building a network is low, therefore,
then observing the network signal is not informative and the legislator still will be unable to separate the two
types of mayors. The legislator may select a mayor as a broker, but they are risking selecting a not ambitious
mayor who will fail to deliver votes.
Further complicating the decision is the fact that both mayors will be willing to pay a higher cost for
a larger benefit. If the benefit that the legislator can extract from the ministry is larger, then the legislator
is more likely to select a mayor without knowledge of that mayors type. Similarly, the larger σH − αL, or
the difference between the payoff for receiving credit and the base payoff for receiving a good for the not
ambitious mayor, the larger the area where there will be a pooling equilibrium. So, if the not ambitious mayor
only receives a very small payoff for receiving a benefit, but receives a relatively large payoff for getting
credit for that benefit, then the not ambitious mayor will be willing to invest more in building a network. In
sum, when the benefit is large, the cost of network building is low, and/or the difference between the benefit
for receiving credit and the benefit for receiving a good for the not ambitious mayor is high, then the not
ambitious mayor will mimic the ambitious network by investing in network building. If this is the case, then
the legislator is always taking a risk when they select a mayor as a broker.
When the cost of sending the signal is sufficiently high, neither type of mayor will pay the cost of
building a network. Regardless of how large the benefit, k, is that the mayor can receive, they will prefer to
receive nothing. This is counter-intuitive: when politicians value their reputation with voters, they should
always prefer receiving a benefit to not receiving a benefit. However, if it is expensive to build a network,
as could be the case when there is no pre-existing infrastructure to connect with voters and the mayor is
particularly unpopular, then a mayor might choose to forgo strengthening their network, and the potential
benefits from the national government. When the payoff an ambitious mayor gets for receiving a benefit, αH ,
is low, it’s possible for there to be a quite large area where the cost of sending the signal is simply too large
for a mayor to pay. As when the cost of network building is low, when the cost of network building is high
the legislator cannot use network building signals as a way to select brokers.
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Notably, it is possible to observe a separating equilibrium where the ambitious mayor pays to send the
signal while the not ambitious mayor does not send the signal. In this condition, the signal is informative
for the legislator. Merely observing the signal informs the legislator that a mayor is ambitious and that, by
providing the benefit, they are selecting a reliable broker. There are two conditions that must be met in order
for legislators to be able to use a network building signal in order to select a reliable broker. The first is that
the legislator must be providing a relatively small benefit where k < 1σH−αH−αL In other words, the benefit
must be smaller than the inverse of the benefit the not ambitious mayor receives from claiming credit, less
the base benefit both mayors receive for getting a benefit. Within the range from the smallest benefit where
the not ambitious mayor does not attribute credit until this point, there are costs of network building that
encourage an informative separating equilibrium.
The national legislator prefers a separating equilibrium since it means they are able to identify, and select,
a reliable broker. This equilibrium space can be interpreted in two ways: as the range of benefits where the
equilibrium is possible and as cost of network building where this equilibrium occurs. Holding the payoff the
not ambitious mayor receives when they claim credit, σH , constant, the range of benefits where a separating
equilibrium is possible is characterized by the difference between the payoffs for receiving a benefit for the
ambitious and not ambitious mayors, αH −αL. When the two mayors receive similar payoffs just from being
selected as a broker, the range of benefits where a separating equilibrium is possible is quite small. This
means it is less likely to observe a desirable separating equilibrium. As the difference between these two
values grows because being selected as a broker is more desirable to an ambitious mayor, then there are more
benefits where the separating equilibrium is possible.
For the legislator to be able to identify ambitious mayors, it must also be true that the ambitious mayor is
willing to pay a higher cost for building their network than the not ambitious mayor. This occurs when the
ambitious mayor receives a larger benefit for attributing credit than the not ambitious mayor does for claiming
credit and the cost of network building must fall between these two payoffs. This space can be interpreted by
holding the payoff the ambitious mayor receives for any benefit, αH , and the payoff the not ambitious mayor
receives for any benefit, αL constant. If the payoff the not ambitious mayor receives when they claim credit,
σH , is relatively low, then the not ambitious mayor is less likely to invest in network building. As a result,
there is a larger range of costs for network building where the ambitious mayor can be identified. Conversely,
if the payoff the not ambitious mayor receives for claiming credit is relatively large, then this mayor is more
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likely to invest in building a network and it is less likely that a legislator will be able to separate ambitious
and not ambitious mayors.
This tells us that it is quite difficult for legislators to select reliable brokers. While there is a separating
equilibrium where the legislator can perfectly separate ambitious from not ambitious mayors, and thus can
trust they are selecting a reliable broker, this equilibrium is relatively difficult to observe. This equilibrium
space can only occur across a small range of both benefits and costs of network building. For the legislator,
their best chance of providing a benefit to a reliable broker is when the benefit they provide is in the range
k ∈ ( 1σH ,
1
σH−αH−αL ], or between the lowest size benefit where the two mayors behave differently and the
benefit where the two types of mayors can expect the same payoff. Furthermore, the cost of network building
must be close to the payoff the ambitious mayor receives for getting the benefit. Otherwise, it is likely that
the legislator cannot identify reliable brokers, and instead can only minimize their risk by providing a benefit
when the mayor has a relatively low cost of network building.
2.4.2 Testing the Equilibria: Mayor Behavior Across Types
The signaling model assumes that legislators will want to select mayors as brokers. In interviews, I find
support for this assumption. As one legislator from the Valle de Cauca department, when discussing the jam
system, exclaimed “I don’t use [jam] to reach my constituents, but every other legislator has their mayors who
they like to work with because they know [the mayor] will work for them”8. In order to confirm that these
mayors are investing in network building, I conducted interviews with mayors and local-level bureaucrats
in the Antioquia and Valle de Cauca departments in Colombia. During these interviews, we discussed
the process of receiving additional funds for local-level projects, interactions with officials at additional
levels of government, future political aspirations, and maintaining relationships with citizens. We discussed
network building broadly, but both ambitious and non-ambitious mayors referenced patronage as something
“everyone” participates in. The universal acceptance of patronage as central to Colombian politics supports
the idea that a network-building signal is a frequent- and important- observation. In interviews, legislators
further emphasized the idea that legislators look to mayors as brokers.
The model predicts that the most common equilibrium solution is a pooling equilibrium where both
ambitious and non ambitious mayors will invest in building networks and be selected as brokers, but only
8Interview conducted October 2018
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ambitious mayors will attribute credit. This outcome is reflected in the Antioquia department, where I
interviewed several mayors from small municipalities outside of Medellin. These municipalities can all
be classified as predominately rural and are heavily dependent on funds from the central government.
Moreover, these municipalities would have relatively low costs for network building because they have small
populations and high levels of need, providing opportunities to connect with citizens and a situation where
small investments in clientelist strategies could have a large impact. In both cases, even a small project funded
through jam would improve the quality of life in the municipalities. Thus, jam projects would be valuable for
the mayors, especially if they were to receive credit for the club goods.
In the first municipality, the former mayor was adamant in their insistence that they would only ever want
to serve in municipal-level political office. The mayor was passionate about local issues and improving their
municipality’s economy, but felt that any step towards department or national government would hurt the
mayor’s ability focus on giving back to their hometown. This mayor would be classified as a not-ambitious
type. A member of their administration further explained that this mayor ran whenever they were eligible and
a personal friend and ally of the mayor ran in the off terms since mayors cannot serve two consecutive terms.
The three officials had been friends since grade school and the bureaucrat served in both administrations
in order to help provide continuity across terms. When asked about how projects are communicated with
citizens, the mayor stated that any new project in the municipality was the mayor’s success. The mayor put
work into building the relationships and generating the funds, and the mayor did what needed to be done
to encourage investments into the municipality. This work included building networks with other mayors
to apply for funds for larger projects that would benefit the municipality and, crucially, spending time in
Medellin in order to strengthen relationships with higher-level government officials. Even when discussing
projects that were joint efforts across several municipalities, the mayor claimed credit, explaining “I put
together a group of mayors...”.
In the second municipality, another mayor, when asked about receiving fiscal transfers from the central
government, lamented just how difficult it was to receive those transfers. The official channels for inter-
governmental funds, where the municipalities can apply for specific projects, was “almost impossible” and
the only way to get these funds was to focus on building relationships with legislators who would be able to
help them. This mayor regularly talked about their desire to run for higher level government because only
in department or national government would they have the power to do what they wanted to do. Until then,
however, they said any new project in the municipality came from a relationship with another politician. For
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them, new investments in the municipality were joint efforts, and there was a clear respect for politicians in
national government because they could select their allies and help distribute funds.
The above case illustrates that when investing in networks is inexpensive, it is likely that both types of
mayors will invest in building networks and the legislator will have trouble separating the ambitious and
not ambitious mayors. The legislator would only receive credit for a project in the second municipality and
would prefer to work with this mayor. However, based on both mayors commitment to network building, the
legislator is equally likely to select the first mayor as a broker. This mayors commitment to building political
alliances might even make them more desirable on a surface level, illustrating just how challenging it is for
legislators to select reliable brokers.
Support for the preferred separating equilibrium, where a legislator could identify ambitious and not-
ambitious mayors and make more informed choices about their brokers, were evident in interviews in the
Valle de Cauca department. Here, local officials spoke openly about their use of clientelism and the costs
associated with this form of network-building. One local level bureaucrat explained “In good politics, you
make sure all the temporary positions are filled with your friends, or you make positions for them. Everyone
needs to do it.” This official emphasized that it made sense to use patronage so that a mayor could maintain
their network. Later, when discussing relationships with national-level representatives, they returned to the
idea of patronage, saying “The government likes when you provide jobs” and said “They help you more when
you show you keep supporters, and that helps you”. Here, building a network was important, but the more a
mayor did to build that network, the better off they were. The signaling model predicts that ambitious mayors
will be willing to invest more in network building for relatively small goods. The discussion of the variation
in the cost of network building supports this: legislators not only considered whether the network existed,
but also how much investment went into the network. As a result, it was possible to build well-established
networks of mayors who would attribute credit.
2.5 Conclusion
When both mayors and legislators have incentives to cultivate strong voter networks, the challenge of choosing
the right mayor as a broker is never straightforward. As a result, legislators are likely to be discerning in how
they distribute benefits. Instead of maximizing how many municipalities receive goods, these legislators will
instead look to provide goods where mayors are most likely to act as reliable brokers so that the legislators
27
receives credit for their investment. This allows legislators to exercise more risk aversion, providing benefits
only where they trust the benefits will translate into votes. By using political ambition to differentiate types
of mayors, I am able to better analyze when legislators will be able to make informed decisions about which
mayors they can use as brokers.
One may expect that non-ambitious politicians, who prioritize their relationships with local voters, may
be the most likely to invest in building strong local networks if they hope to continue serving their municipality.
These mayors need to maintain local support, especially in places like Colombia where term-limits require
mayors to maintain their loyal networks without serving consecutive terms. Ambitious mayors, on the
other hand, may be more interested in just bringing goods to the municipality, regardless of credit. This
intuition informs each mayor’s utility function: ambitious mayors get more than non-ambitious mayors just
for receiving a benefit. However, the model equilibria suggest that the opposite is true: ambitious mayors
are willing to invest more in building a local network in order to receive relatively small club goods benefits.
This finding suggests that, while non-ambitious mayors value receiving credit from their constituents for
goods, they may only pay the cost of signaling their network strength for quite large projects. For legislators,
ambitious mayors’ willingness to pay more to invest in building networks creates a situation where the
legislator can distinguish mayor types and select mayors as brokers who are likely to deliver votes.
This article also provides important insights about the behavior of mayors. The pooling equilibrium
where all types of mayors invest in building networks suggests one possible reason why mayors, despite not
being able to serve consecutive terms, may choose to invest in costly network building. While the payoffs for
these investments cannot be realized until a future electoral cycle where external factors may have shifted
public preferences, investing in building local networks is a tool that mayors can use to recruit funding for
public works. If legislators see network-building as a sign of ambition, as is suggested in interviews across
actors at different levels of government, then investing is not only a way to build a political following, but
also a way to encourage the national government to invest locally. When local politicians use clientelist
strategies to build their networks, the competition to receive limited resources from the national government
may encourage clientelism as a way, not only to connect with voters, but also to signal their capacity to other
politicians.
This article also highlights a future challenge for legislators. In the short term, legislators want to select
ambitious mayors because these mayors are most likely to attribute credit. Thus, the legislator will look for
mayors who invest in costly network building activities. However, by attempting to use ambitious mayors
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as brokers, legislators are providing resources to brokers who may one day replace them. In the long term,
legislators may be pursuing a strategy that contributes to their own electoral losses.
This model can be extended to allow the cost of network building to change for different types of mayors.
Introducing more variation in the cost of clientelism will help explain when it is more likely to observe the
pooling equilibrium or a separating equilibrium. Similarly, the cost of network building can be divided into
relatively inexpensive activities, like town hall initiatives, and more costly strategies, like targeted clientelist
benefits. Understanding exactly when it is rational for mayors to pay the cost of network building and for
legislators to provide club goods benefits is important for understanding who voters reward- and why. When
clientelism is used at the local-level as part of a network-building strategy, then knowing how this signal
influences receiving club goods may provide insight about why voters continue to elect clientelist politicians.
In surveys across contexts, voters complain about clientelist politicians and argue these politicians are either
corrupt or are not acting in the best interest of citizens. Yet, in these same contexts, citizens elect and reelect
clientelist politicians. Through a more thorough analysis of how clientelism, as one strategy politicians can
use to build networks, can be used as a signal of a politicians capacity, it becomes more rational for voters to
support these politicians.
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CHAPTER 3: MEASURING LOCAL-LEVEL CLIENTELISM: A BAYESIAN MIXED-MEMBERSHIP
APPROACH
Scholars of distributive politics often discuss the importance of the use of clientelism. However, since
clientelist exchanges occur under the table, we lack strong observational data to estimate the actual prevalence
of clientelism. The current solution is to use survey experiments designed to elicit sensitive information
in order to create population-level estimates.This measurement strategy, however, does not permit us to
estimate within-country variation in the use of clientelism. In order to address this challenge, I propose
estimating local-level clientelism using a Bayesian Mixed-Membership model. Using data from Colombia on
the employees who are employed as temporary teachers, I model whether the teachers are hired based on
their meritocratic qualifications or to fulfill political aims, Specifically, I consider the type of vacancy the
teacher fills, the level of education the teacher has, whether their education aligns with what they are teaching,
where the school is located within the municipality, how the teacher is paid, and any bonuses received. I use
these municipal hiring patterns to estimate the presence of clientelism at the municipal level. These estimates
align with survey questions from the same time period.
3.1 Motivation
To what extent do politicians rely on clientelist strategies to build and maintain voter networks? Clientelism, or
the targeted exchange of benefits for votes, turnout, or abstention (Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007), is a tool that
politicians use widely to win elections. However, studies of clientelism face challenges in estimating just how
often politicians use this strategy to achieve political aims. Given the importance of clientelism in electoral
politics, the existing challenges in estimating how often clientelist exchanges occur limits what questions
studies of clientelism can answer. While the literature has made advancements in understanding where
clientelism occurs, how it occurs, when it is likely to be successful, and the consequences for citizens (Dekel,
Jackson & Wolinsky 2008, Calvo & Murillo 2012, Stokes et al. 2013, Frye, Reuter & Szakonyi 2014, Lawson
& Greene 2014, Holland & Palmer-Rubin 2015, Rueda 2015, Larreguy, Montiel Olea & Querubin 2017), it
has not been able to fully explore within-country variation in the use of clientelism. As more studies evaluate
the limitations of clientelism (Weitz-Shapiro 2012, Gingerich & Medina 2013, Greene 2017), measuring just
how much politicians use clientelist strategies, as opposed to other strategies (Luna 2014), is increasingly
important.
Measuring clientelism is a particularly difficult task for two reasons. First, clientelist exchanges are
discrete and indirect: Targeted exchanges of cash or benefits are not listed in official budgets and jobs are not
officially classified as patronage-based. Therefore, there is no explicit data available on clientelist exchanges.
Second, in many contexts clientelism is seen as corruption or “dirty” politics. Social norms reduce citizens’
likelihood of openly admitting their exposure to clientelist politics.
Three main techniques have been used to overcome these challenges: first, formal models have been
used to generate predictions about clientelism that can be tested without explicit estimates of the prevalence
of clientelism (Becker 1983, Snyder 1991, Myerson 1993, Lizzeri & Persico 2001, Khemani 2010, Persico,
Pueblita & Silverman 2011). Second, many scholars have relied on in-depth qualitative interviews that
provide rich data about the specific nature of clientelist interactions and dynamics (Abers 1998, Muñoz
2014, Ocampo 2014, Zarazaga 2014). Both of these techniques have improved our understanding of
clientelism as a phenomenon, but not on how often politicians use clientelist strategies. Third, in order to
estimate the prevalence of clientelism, scholars have begun relying on survey list experiments designed to
reduce social desirability bias and elicit sensitive information (Blair & Imai 2012, Blair, Imai & Lyall 2014,
Greene 2017). These experiments have allowed scholars to estimate clientelism at the national level, but
recruiting enough citizens to use survey list experiments for subnational estimates is logistically improbable.
A possible risk of relying only on national-level estimates is that these survey experiments ignore areas
with remarkably high (or low) levels of clientelism that may be important for shaping national politics.
Furthermore, understanding variation in clientelism within country make it possible to conduct inference
where clientelism is an independent variable.
I propose an alternative technique for measuring clientelism that makes it possible to generate estimates at
the local-level using Bayesian analysis. I develop a Bayesian Mixed-Membership model in order to estimate
clientelism using existing data on both the different demographics across subnational units and observed
features of public sector employees. This estimation strategy addresses the limitations of existing measures
because it uses existing data, rather than new survey data, to robustly estimate the use of clientelism in a way
that highlights within-case variation. This estimation strategy helps provide new avenues for studying the
effects of clientelism because it can be used to highlight the variance across time, regions, and localities.
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3.2 A Model for Local-Level Clientelism
3.2.1 Bayesian Mixed Membership Models
Mixed-Membership models are used to classify data into latent classes (Airoldi, Blei, Erosheva & Feinberg
2014, Joutard, Airoldi & Love 2008). Unlike many classification models that assume an item can belong to
only one class, Mixed-Membership models have the advantage of allowing each observation to have partial
membership in multiple classes. Thus, rather than assigning categorical measures, they classify items along
a continuum. In the case of clientelism, this is particularly useful because it allows employees to be both
qualified and clientelist hires.
In particular, I focus on Hierarchical Bayesian Mixed-Membership Models (Joutard, Airoldi & Love
2008). These models are especially nuanced in their approach to assigning class membership. First, these
models are able to pool information at different levels of analysis. As a result, they can account for nested
data, such as individuals within households or neighborhoods. Furthermore, using a Bayesian framework
means that data at the individual level can be used to update the expectations generated by the group-level
data. The approach is crucial for refining estimates when data availability varies widely across the units of
interest.
These models have been applied in political science to study text-as-data (as the canonical LDA model
is a type of mixed-membership model) and to improve our estimates of ideology (GrGross & Manrique-
Vallier 2014). Using this strategy permits more nuanced analysis since a unit’s classification highlights the
extent to which any label applies.
3.2.2 Applying Mixed Membership Models to Clientelism
I build on this tradition by applying mixed membership models to the study of clientelism. The goal of the
model is to estimate the amount of clientelism in a given municipality using data at both the municipal level
and the individual level.
At the individual level, I use data on public service hires. First, I stipulate that there are two classes of
hires in public service: meritocratic hires and patronage hires. Patronage hires represent one particular type
of clientelism (viz. the exchange of jobs for political support) but I assume that where patronage occurs, it is
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more likely that other forms of clientelism coexist. Thus, patronage is a meaningful proxy for clientelism
broadly.
I begin with the argument that it is possible for a job to be given to a qualified candidate and still be used
as part of a patronage-based exchange. The Bayesian Mixed-Membership model allows me to estimate the
degree to which patronage was responsible for the allocation of any given job. The goal of the estimation is
to understand what latent unit-level mixtures explain the observed data on temporary hires in order to better
understand the use of patronage. In order to do this, I use available data on the demographic and political
characteristics of each municipality that correlate with clientelism.
Past research has shown that clientelism is more likely in small municipalities with high levels of need
(Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007). Further, mismanagement of a municipality’s finances may indicate hidden
behavior, such as clientelism. These municipal demographics can be used to generate informative priors
concerning the possible prevalence of clientelism in a municipality.
The initial expectation of clientelism is generated using the following process:
1. There is a matrix, A that contains M rows and X columns. Each row, M , represents a municipality
while each column, X , is a demographic characteristic for the municipality.
2. Conditional on matrix A, sample a coefficient, γ, for each municipal-level characteristic.
γ ∼ N(0, 10) (3.1)
3. Using the samples for γ, estimate µm, an expectation of meritocratic hires for each municipality.
µm|γ = Logit−1(Aγm)∀m (3.2)
I then refine the estimate, µm using the available data about public service hires, in order to generate an
estimate, πm, for meritocratic hiring in each municipality. I argue that the data on hires is a function of how
often any feature of a hire is likely to occur, θ, and an indicator variable that indicates whether any given
observed trait of a hire occurs under patronage, Z. By including this data using the total count of how often
any type of job or feature of a hire is observed, the model is able to fit the parameters θ, Z, and πm that best
explain the data. In order to do this, I assume the following data generating process:
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1. For each municipality, sample a proportion of meritocratic hires, πm, that estimates to what extent
hiring decisions reflect meritocratic decisions given the number of hires, n, in each municipality
πm|n ∼ Beta(µm, φ)∀m (3.3)
φ ∼ Gamma(2, 2) (3.4)
2. Each hire exhibits a series of characteristics, J . For each J , sample an indicator variable, Z, that tracks
whether the observed characteristic is a member of the meritocratic class.
zmj |π, n ∼ Binomial(πm)∀m, j (3.5)
3. For each municipality, sample a mixed membership vector, θ, which controls the likelihood of observing
characteristics under the patronage and meritocratic regimes.
θ ∼ β(1, 1) (3.6)
(3.7)
4. The data for the presence of any characteristic, J , for each municipality, M populate a matrix, Y.
Ymj |θ, Z ∼ f(ymj |θj , zmj)∀m, j (3.8)
The final estimates for municipal-level clientelism are one minus the point-estimates for πm most
consistent with both the municipal-level demographics and the profile of characteristics exhibited by the
public service hires. The distributions I select are used to best accommodate the structure of the data. The
characteristics of hires are all dummy variables where 0 indicates that the characteristic is not present while 1
indicates that the characteristic is present. Since there are multiple hires, the data is a count of how often each
characteristic occurs across that municipality’s temporary teachers. I use a binomial distribution to classify
each indicator. The parameters for municipal-level indicators are estimated using a logit link so that they take
values between 0 and 1. The final posterior estimates for 1− πm are the extent to which employment in the
public sector reflects patronage.
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3.3 Data
I test this estimation strategy using data on teacher hires in Colombia in 2013. In Colombia, clientelist
linkages have persisted despite major constitutional changes in 1991 that reshaped the political party system,
fractured the two traditional political parties, and facilitated the rise of non-traditional parties and personalistic
candidates (Dargent & Muñoz 2011, Bedoya Marulanda & Arenas Gómez 2015). Furthermore, clientelist
dynamics vary widely throughout the country, due in part to the intersection of a deinstitutionalzed party
system and the presence of external actors throughout the long civil conflict (Eaton 2006, Holland & Palmer-
Rubin 2015). Notably, these features make it difficult to trace the use of clientelism using political party
networks and any national-level estimate risks underestimating the importance of clientelism in some regions
where traditional personal networks are still central to politics.
I use patronage because during field research in 2016-2018, interview subjects throughout Colombia
identified patronage as a particularly salient concern.1 I focus specifically on teacher hires because, in
addition to permanent employees, temporary employment occurs frequently due to inefficiency in the civil-
service appointment of teachers.2 Furthermore, qualitative interviews suggest that the number of teachers is
often inflated to help the municipality receive additional funds from the central government, increasing the
opportunity for politically-motivated hiring practices.3
My data is generated at two levels. At the municipal level, I create the base-estimates for the risk
of clientelism using characteristics of municipalities that past research has shown to be associated with
clientelism (Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007, Weitz-Shapiro 2012, Lucciasano & Macdonald 2012, Stokes
et al. 2013). First, I consider the fiscal responsibility of the municipality. In Colombia, this indicator is
produced by the central government and considers whether the municipality manages their funds efficiently. A
municipality with better transparency in their financial reporting and more efficient spending patterns should
have lower levels of clientelism. Then, I consider the level of material need in the municipality using the
number of homes enrolled to receive additional social benefits. Since clientelism often targets lower-income
populations, municipalities with higher levels of enrollment should be more prone to clientelism. Third, I
consider the population of the municipality. In particular, I use the school-aged population since I focus
1Interviews conducted July-August 2016 and July-December 2018
2Ibid
3Interview conducted July 2016
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explicitly on teachers. This measure is essential since clientelism tends to occur more often in smaller
municipalities where citizens can be more easily monitored. However, there may be more clientelism where
the number of students is artificially inflated. Thus, I am agnostic about the effects of population.
In order to refine the estimates of clientelism for each municipality, I use the profile of characteristics
of the employed teachers. I identify whether a teacher has the requisite qualifications by coding whether
their educational attainment matches the requirements for the position they are hired for. Less qualified
teachers are more likely to reflect politically-motivated hires. I then consider where the employee’s job is
located using two characteristics. The first is if they are at a single school, in a single district, or in a “floating
position” where the teacher travels as needed. The second is whether the school they are employed in is
in an urban or rural area within a municipality. These measures seek to explore how visible the teacher is:
floating teachers in more rural areas are likely to be less monitored and may reflect more political hires. Next,
I consider how the teacher is paid: using the municipality’s resources or the resources from the national
government ear-marked for education spending as well as if they received a bonus for their work. In Colombia,
teachers are supposed to be paid through the national government education funds, the Sistema General de
Participacion (SGP). Thus, receiving larger bonuses or being paid through the municipalities own resources
may signal that clientelism is occurring. In order to fully understand the nature of temporary employment, I
identify the type of vacancy the teacher fills (tenured permanent vacancy, a definite vacancy, a temporary
long term vacancy, a temporary short term vacancy, or other temporary vacancy), the type of teacher the
employee is, and if the employee is from a minority ethnic group. These variables help me observe patterns
in who the municipality hires for public service jobs. The occurrences of each characteristic that employees
posses, conditioned on the information about the municipality they work in, allow me to estimate the use of
clientelism for each municipality.
3.4 Results and Validity Checks
I estimate the level of clientelism from 0 to 1 using one chain with 100000 samples and a burn-in of 10000.
This model passes all standard convergence tests and has a maximum Rhat value of 1.000 I find that municipal
estimates range from 0.158 to 0.662 with a mean level of clientelism of 0.362. The estimate suggests that
clientelism is quite common in Colombia, but highlights the variation in just how often it occurs in any given
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Figure 3.1: Estimates of Clientelism in Colombia, 2013
Figure 3.1 displays the variation across Colombia. On average, areas along the coast and the Amazon
rainforest are darker, indicating higher levels of patronage. This offers some face validity for those familiar
with the case of Colombia. The Colombian Civil conflict involved large concentrations of militant groups,
including the FARC, near the Amazon rainforest. These groups were also involved in clientelist exchanges,
acting as brokers for politicians in these areas (Eaton 2006). Moreover, qualitative research has established
that clientelism is quite frequent along the coast. Ocampo (2014) draws attention to the prevalence of
clientelism in the department of Córdoba from 1950-2010. In my data, the mean level of clientelism in
Córdoba is 0.427 while in the rest of Colombia, excluding Córdoba, the mean is 0.366. This difference is
statistically significant at the p < 0.01 level and suggests that clientelism is much more common in this
region of the country.
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3.4.1 Validation Tests: Clientelism and Corruption
While clientelism and corruption are fundamentally different concepts, they often tend to covary. I expect
that more clientelist municipalities are also more likely to be municipalities that citizens perceive as corrupt.
I test whether my measure of clientelism aligns with this expectation using data from the Latin American
Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) surveys in Colombia from 2012, 2013, and 2014. These surveys were all
taken during the mayoral term that ran from January 1, 2012 to December 31, 2015 so that the same leaders
were in office as during the year used to estimate municipal-level clientelism. I identify two question from
the 2012, 2013, and 2014 rounds of LAPOP surveys that measure perceptions of corruption.
I consider a question asking citizens to what extent the government combats corruption. The citizen’s
respond on a scale from 1 “they do nothing” to 7 “they do a lot”. If my estimate of clientelism is valid, I would
expect citizens in municipalities with high levels of clientelism to be less likely to report that the government
is working to combat corruption. I run an ordered logit and find support for this: the coefficient is negative
and statistically significant.4 In Figure 3.2a, I highlight three categories of responses: the government does
nothing, the central category where the government does some, and the government does a lot. As the level
of clientelism increases, the probability that respondents answer that the government does nothing increases
while the probability that respondents say the government does some or a lot decreases.
I repeat this test using a question asking citizens how widespread corruption is in public officials. Citizens
could respond to this question on a four-point scale ranging from “not widespread” to “very widespread”.
If my estimates of clientelism are valid, I expect that citizens in municipalities with higher estimates of
clientelism are more likely to respond that corruption is “very widespread”. I find that citizens in more
clientelist municipalities are more likely to perceive public officials as corrupt. The coefficient for clientelism
is positive and statistically significant. As seen in Figure 3.2b, where there are higher levels of clientelism the
probability that citizens identify corruption as very widespread increases, and the probability that citizens
respond that corruption is not widespread decreases. These tests, as well as the qualitative support, suggests
that the measure is capturing where patronage is most common throughout the country.
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(b) Predicted Probability of Responses for Perception of Corruption in Public
Officials
Figure 3.2: Predicted Probability of Survey Responses Given Clientelism in the Respondent’s Municipality
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3.5 Applying the Measure
With a new method of estimating local-level clientelism, researchers can answer a series of questions that
could not be answered before. For example, we can ask how the presence of clientelism changes citizens
perceptions of their local officials. In the LAPOP surveys, citizens are asked “to what extent do you have
confidence in your mayor?”. The respondents answer on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is no confidence and 7
is the most confidence. Using an ordered logit regression, I find that citizens in municipalities with a higher
level of clientelism are less likely to have confidence in their mayors.5 In figure 3.3 I plot the predicted
probabilities that citizens respond they have no trust, some trust, or complete trust in their mayors based on

















No Trust Some Trust
Full Trust
Figure 3.3: Predicted Probability of Responses for Trust in Mayor
Moreover, with an estimate of clientelism at the local level it is possible to test whether mayors who
are reelected are more likely to engage in clientelist behavior than mayors who are serving their first term
5See appendix for regression table
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in office. I use election results from the 2003 and 2011 elections in Colombia in order to identify which
mayors serving from 2012-2015 had been in office the last term they could legally serve, from 2004-2007.
In 2011, 6.43% of elected mayors had served from 2004-2007. I use a difference of means test to compare
estimated levels of clientelism in 2013 between the two groups. I find that the average estimate for clientelism
in municipalities with reelected mayors is 0.333 while the average estimate of clientelism in municipalities
where the mayor did not serve from 2004-2007 is 0.362. This difference is significant at the p < 0.01 level
and suggests that the returns from using clientelism may decrease as politicians have served more terms in
office.
3.6 Discussion
In this paper, I present a novel application of mixed-membership models as a tool to estimate clientelism at
the local level. Using data from Colombia in 2013, I find that mixed-membership models help to distinguish
which municipalities have higher relative levels of clientelism. This measure is validated using survey
questions from the Latin American Public Opinion Project on corruption during the same mayoral period.
Having a method to estimate local-level clientelism greatly contributes to our ability to answer questions
about the effect of clientelism on politics. For example, with information about clientelism at the local-level,
we can better evaluate how the use of patronage affect the probability of reelection or how the use of patronage
correlates with politician’s margins of victory. These advances will bring scholars of clientelism closer to
estimating the actual effect of clientelism on electoral outcomes.
This model can easily be applied in additional contexts. The same strategy can be used in any country
that uses patronage to target voters. When there is available data on temporary hires, it is possible to apply
my Bayesian Mixed-Membership estimation strategy in order to estimate relative levels of patronage across
geographic units. Similarly, this estimation strategy can be used to evaluate how the use of patronage varies
across public sectors. Using data from other sectors, scholars can answer questions about how the public
sector using patronage affects the types of voters who can benefit. Finally, this strategy can be used to observe
how the use of patronage has changed over time in the same geographic unit. Using a Bayesian hierarchical
mixed-membership model to estimate clientelism opens a new avenue for clientelism research. With an
estimation strategy for observing variation in the use of clientelism across geographic units, scholars can
better analyze the extent to which clientelism affects elections and redistribution.
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CHAPTER 4: CLUB GOODS PROVISION: THE EFFECT OF WEAK PARTIES ON CLIENTELISM
STRATEGIES
How do politicians strategically allocate funds for political gain in the context of weak political parties?
In much of the literature on distributive politics, political parties play an instrumental role in determining the
allocation of funds. Particularly in clientelist systems, political parties are seen as instrumental for finding
reliable brokers who can help translate targeted goods into votes. However, in many democracies, political
parties lack both the discipline to insure a cohesive group of elected party members and the internal capacity
to build and maintain clientelist networks. I argue that when parties are unable to oversee clientelist machines,
national politicians will use relationships with local politicians to determine where to allocate discretionary
funds in the form of club goods. I argue that regardless of the political party in office, national politicians
are more likely to target municipalities where mayors have personal clientelist networks in place. I explore
these relationships in the context of Colombia. Using a Bayesian Mixed-Membership model, I estimate
municipal-level clientelism. I find that municipalities with higher levels of clientelism are likely to receive
more club goods projects and more discretionary transfers.
4.1 Introduction
In order to reach voters, politicians often depend on political parties to help them coordinate their electoral
strategies. Political parties can help provide resources, streamline programmatic messaging, and manage the
clientelist machine. However, in much of the developing world, politicians cannot trust political parties to
help them reach voters. First, many political parties lack the capacity to coordinate strategies and maintain
party discipline. Limited resources make it difficult for parties to help politicians reach the voters they need
to target. Second, in many of these countries, a large proportion of citizens are non-partisan. Politicians who
target citizens using clientelism, therefore, need to find strategies to reach citizens that do not depend on a
political party machine.
Although the challenges that parties face are far-reaching, most of our understanding of how politicians
target voters assumes, at minimum, that these politicians have the support and guidance of a political party.
Most theories of clientelism assume parties are institutions with the capacity to make decisions about whether
to target swing or loyal voters and to maintain party discipline through a clear hierarchy. When these party
machines use clientelism as a strategy to target voters, the machine is responsible for recruiting loyal brokers
capable of delivering votes. Particularly in non-programmatic contexts, our dependence on party-driven
theories limits our understanding of exactly how, when, and where politicians choose to use targeted goods.
How, exactly, do politicians who cannot rely on a party machine make decisions about when and where to
use clientelist appeals to reach voters? What type of clientelist appeal is most feasible in this context? Who
do independent politicians work with?
I propose a theory to explain how politicians in weak party contexts use club goods as clientelist benefits
in order to target voters. I argue that when politicians cannot rely on political parties to help them select
brokers, they will use alternative brokers to help them distribute club goods. Club goods refer to benefits in
the form of public goods that are only accessible to a particular subset of the population. For example, a new
water treatment facility that cleans water for a limited geographic area or a new road that connects remote
farmers to marketplaces can both be classified as club goods. In this context, club goods are particularly
useful because they are flexible to local needs and can increase the number of voters reached with a targeted
good. However, in order for club goods to behave like clientelist benefits, national politicians need to work
with local-level brokers who can help oversee who receives the club good and where the club good is best able
to incentivize voters to support the national politician. Due to their knowledge of local conditions, local-level
politicians can act as effective brokers when national politicians provide club goods. I analyze the case where
the local brokers are mayors.
One of the core tenets of a reliable broker is their ability to deliver votes. Thus, legislators will seek out
local-level politicians because they have proven that they can mobilize local voters. In order to determine
which local politicians can most effectively translate club goods into votes, however, legislators will consider
whether the local politician has built a clientelist network. Clientelist networks suggest the presence of a local
voter network that can be incentivized using clientelist benefits. I argue that legislators are more likely to
provide club goods to municipalities where the mayor has invested in building a clientelist network.
I present a novel estimation strategy to determine the prevalence of clientelism in each municipality.
In order to estimate clientelism, I use a Bayesian Mixed-Membership model. My estimates of municipal
clientelism allow us to understand how local-level dynamics affect club good allocation because they highlight
the variation in the use of clientelism within a single country. I estimate the use of clientelism at the municipal
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level in Colombia and use these estimates to test the theory that municipalities where mayors have invested in
building stronger clientelist networks are more likely to be chosen as brokers for club goods benefits.
I test the theory in Colombia for two reasons. First, in Colombia there are both weak political parties and
high number of non-partisan citizens. As a result, Colombia fits the scope conditions of where I would expect
legislators to rely on local-level politicians to help them translate club goods into votes. Second, politics in
Colombia are largely non-programmatic, so many politicians depend on clientelism to help target voters.
I find that municipalities with higher rates of clientelism are more likely to receive club goods, even after
controlling for other factors found to increase the use of clientelism. This is particularly noteworthy since
in Colombia, mayors cannot serve consecutive terms–an electoral rule that should reduce the benefits of
building relationships through iterative clientelist interactions–yet clientelism continues to bring resources to
municipalities.
4.2 Clientelism in Modern Democracies
Traditionally, clientelist relationships are maintained through a strict hierarchy: clientelist parties will enlist
brokers to distribute resources to voters in a way that helps maximize vote share (Stokes et al. 2013, Kitschelt
& Wilkinson 2007). At each step in this hierarchy, moral hazards arise as politicians monitor brokers who
make sure voters behave as expected. In this framework, political parties play a central role in coordinating
the selection and monitoring of well-embedded and reliable brokers in an attempt to overcome moral hazard
problems.
The moral hazard associated with targeting voters through clientelism is compounded by several features
of modern democracies. First, the rise of the secret ballot makes it increasingly difficult for brokers to monitor
the voters they target (Gingerich & Medina 2013). Second, in contexts where citizens are largely non-partisan,
clientelist parties face challenges identifying brokers who will be loyal to the party machine and able to identify
swing and loyal voters (Holland & Palmer-Rubin 2015). Finally, the nature of campaigns creates an incentive
to use programmatic appeals that make it difficult to disentangle votes won as a result of clientelist strategies
from votes that are the results of programmatic campaigns (Palmer-Rubin 2018, Greene 2017). Since political
campaigns expect candidates to send messages concerning issues, there is pressure to use campaigns to signal
policy rather than capacity to deliver targeted goods (Greene 2017). Furthermore, clientelism can be more
difficult in decentralized contexts. This is because increases in political party fragmentation (Ryan 2004) and
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deinstitutionalization have made political parties less important in coordinating candidate strategies (Dargent
& Muñoz 2011, Novaes 2014).
Despite these obstacles, clientelism continues to be an effective strategy used by politicians. Unlike
programmatic appeals, clientelist appeals can incentivize loyal voters to turn out and can increase the
visibility of a party or campaign when there are a high number of political parties (Muñoz 2014). While
decentralization has created challenges for political parties building clientelist networks, the devolution of
power has facilitated vote buying in smaller jurisdictions (Khemani 2010, Gervasoni 2010, Gingerich &
Medina 2013, Devarajan, Khemani & Shah 2009). Low partisanship, political uncertainty, and the unintended
consequences of democratic reforms have reduced the incentives for politicians to practice programmatic
politics. The consequence is that, while clientelism has many drawbacks, it is an effective way to targeting
individuals rather than just organized constituencies (Roberts 2002).
Even though political parties cannot control clientelist networks in much of the developing world, studies
of the use of clientelism are still largely focused on clientelist parties and the linkages that parties use to
target voters (Kitschelt 2000, Luna 2014). Many theories of clientelist strategies implicitly treat the party as
the main driver of clientelism. For example, studies of political brokers emphasize the importance of partisan
alignments for broker success (Stokes et al. 2013, Larreguy, Montiel Olea & Querubin 2017, Bueno 2017,
Khemani 2010). Furthermore, even in studies focusing on low-capacity parties, clientelism is treated as a
strategy that can send signals about candidate competence and viability (Muñoz 2014).
How, then, do politicians adapt their clientelist strategies for weak political party and low-partisanship
environments? Some of the ways politicians have modified their strategies include both changing where
they target voters and how they provide clientelist benefits. For example, politicians have changed where
they target voters, with workplaces acting as key locations to mobilize voters, particularly when firms have
strong ties to the government (Frye, Reuter & Szakonyi 2014). Alternatively, clientelism has become more
indirect, with politicians buying votes through the non-enforcement of laws that directly target the poor
(Holland 2015) and the implementation of welfare programs that directly target low-income populations
(Penfold-Becerra 2007, Lucciasano & Macdonald 2012). Finally, politicians have outsourced vote buying
to interest organizations creating different classes of brokers who can be embedded in parties, interest
organizations, or both (Holland & Palmer-Rubin 2015), reducing the reliance on party machines.
I build upon our understanding of party-driven clientelism and the various challenges that politicians
using clientelist strategies face in order to build a theory of how club goods can be used as a clientelist benefit
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in the context of weak political parties. Existing studies of clientelism have shown that politicians have
become more creative in selecting brokers. These brokers can include individuals embedded in business
or civil society organizations or entrepreneurial individuals who act outside organized groups (Holland &
Palmer-Rubin 2015). Further, the literature has shown that there has been a movement towards indirect forms
of clientelism. In the next section, I explain how one particular type of independent broker, local politicians,
can work with national politicians to deliver club goods without relying on a party machine. Club goods are a
particularly interesting type of indirect clientelist benefit because they are particularistic goods that can reach
a larger community of citizens. I will demonstrate that a mayor’s ability to mobilize voters using clientelist
strategies helps explain where legislators will target voters using club goods.
4.3 Theory
4.3.1 Club Good Clientelism
The resources that legislators have access to, and the way in which legislators choose to distribute funds, is
often mediated by political parties. Since political parties have the influence to coordinate central strategies
and build party brands (Lupu 2013, Lupu 2014), they can influence which types of voters are targeted and the
most effective benefits for targeting these voters. However, when political parties do not have the internal
capacity to maintain a strong clientelist machine and cannot identify reliable brokers, national legislators
need to find alternative ways to reach brokers. National legislators lacking a strong clientelist machine to
target voters need to find a strategy that allows them to control both the allocation of the benefit and the
broker who distributes the benefit. I argue that these conditions are met when national legislators provide
club goods, or excludable public goods, for particular municipalities.
Club goods are public benefits that only reach one group of voters. For example, a club good may be a
new water treatment facility that can only clean water for one neighborhood or a road that connects a small
group of rural farmers to the center of town. In both of these examples, the central feature is that only a very
small subset of the population is able to benefit from what would otherwise be a public good. As such, club
goods can be treated as clientelist benefits that can incentivize voters to support a politician in exchange for
access to the good. The group of voters who benefits from a club good have a sense of obligation to repay the
politician who provided that good (Lawson & Greene 2014). While investing in the infrastructure necessary
to provide club goods is costly, they are useful benefits because they are remarkably flexible. The politician
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has control over not only what benefit is provided, but also the scope of voters who can be reached and the
specific public contracts that provide the good. This is a broader strategy that can act as a middle-ground
between a universal programmatic appeal and narrowly targeted gifts of cash for votes. Further, club goods
are indirect. While a group of rural farmers may be targeted by the new road, a wealthy shop owner in the
center of town is less likely to object to these funds than if the farmers were to receive cash incentives for
their vote.
When providing club goods to citizens, legislators have two opportunities to emphasize the norms of
quid-pro-quo exchanges. First, legislators are responsible for determining what firms and workers receive
contracts to construct the infrastructure necessary for providing club goods. For these firms, future work is
contingent on continuing to support the legislator. Second, the group of people who receive the most benefits
from the club good can be enticed to continue supporting the legislator in order to continue receiving benefits.
This offers two clientelist benefits: a direct benefit mirroring patronage in the hiring practices surrounding club
goods and an indirect benefit of using goods provided to a community, rather than an individual, that may help
dissuade the concerns of voters who equate clientelism with corruption (Greene 2017, Weitz-Shapiro 2012).
When deciding whether to include club goods in their portfolio of clientelist strategies, national legislators
are constrained by their desire to maximize expected vote share and minimize political risk.1 As a result,
national legislators will provide club goods to areas where they expect the club good will have the largest
effect in increasing the legislators votes. In order to do so, legislators in weak party systems will seek
alternative brokers who can help translate club goods into votes. Specifically, they will seek brokers who can
be incentivized to deliver votes and who have access to networks receptive to clientelist benefits.
There are a variety of independent brokers who can help to distribute club goods, such as local business
leaders, influential families, and local elected officials. What these brokers have in common is that they
have strong ties in small networks and have the influence to oversee club goods provision. Since club goods
often require coordination between the actor funding the project–in this case the legislator– and the actor
overseeing the provision of the club goods– in this case the local broker– these brokers need to be in positions
of power that lets them monitor the distribution of club goods. In the next section, I focus my analysis on one
type of alternative broker, mayors, who can help translate club goods into votes.
1Political risk refers to providing club goods where there is a low probability of electoral success
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4.3.2 Using Mayors as Brokers
I focus on one particular type of local broker: mayors. Mayors are particularly effective brokers of club
goods because of their administrative capacity to oversee club goods distribution. By nature of their position,
mayors are often responsible for implementing local projects, including those that can be classified as club
goods. This allows them to control where in a municipality club goods are located, how club goods are
made available to voters, and who receives contracts to build the necessary infrastructure for club goods.
Since mayors are also elected officials–and therefore have independent incentives to mobilize voters–they
have independent resources that they have invested to create their own voter networks. For legislators, this
means that mayors have a potential voter block they can deliver who have already demonstrated their loyalty.
Consequently, using mayors as brokers offers legislators the necessary knowledge about voters’ needs and
preferences to help them customize club goods to local contexts.
However, mayors are not perfect brokers. Just as political parties need to try to find reliable brokers
who will deliver votes, legislators building their own networks seek out mayors who they trust can deliver
votes. How, then, do legislators select which mayors to work with? I argue that they focus on the mayors
demonstrated ability to mobilize voters using clientelist linkages.
4.3.3 When and Where are Club Goods Used
In order to decide where to target club goods, national legislators will consider the characteristics of both the
municipality and its mayors. Both features are important because they help determine where providing club
goods is most likely to increase vote share. The demographic characteristics of municipalities help legislators
identify where voters may be most receptive to club goods while the characteristics of the mayors help
legislators identify where they are most likely to work with reliable brokers. Legislators prefer to provide club
goods to municipalities where providing goods is relatively inexpensive in order to reach more municipalities.
Likewise, legislators will prioritize municipalities with poorer citizens since poor citizens are more likely to
accept clientelist benefits (Weitz-Shapiro 2012). Thus, legislators will prioritize municipalities with a higher
level of material need.
More important, however, is a legislator’s ability to target mayors who will act as reliable brokers. First,
the national legislator will look at whether the local mayor already has a clientelist network in order to gauge
the strength and cohesion of the mayors local network. A national politician will provide a club good when
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the mayor is able to provide access to a stable voter network that can be targeted with clientelist benefits. For
legislators, targeting municipalities where the mayor does not have a large voter block is an ineffective use of
their resources.
As a result, national legislators are more likely to provide club goods to mayors who already have
preexisting clientelist networks. This is because when a mayor can punish citizens who fail to support the
national legislator, she is more appealing to the national-level politician since she can credibly deliver votes.
I argue that national politicians will prefer mayors that send a signal that they can monitor voter behavior
because these mayors have independently maintained voter networks. This signal can come in the form of
the mayors’ private funds used in campaigning, use of personal networks in filling bureaucratic positions,
or ability to maintain voter networks even after sitting out a term. For example, in one municipality in the
Antioquia department of Colombia, a mayor and his friend run in alternate terms, creating continuity in a
system that does not allow for consecutive terms while a childhood friend of both politicians serves in each
cabinet 2. The national politician will evaluate both the presence and the strength of clientelist networks when
deciding whether to use club goods.
An alternative explanation would suggest that legislators prioritize municipalities with popular mayors.
However, I argue that clientelism is more important than popularity because it shows not only that mayors
can receive votes, but also that the citizens can be targeted through clientelistic, rather than just programmatic
or personalistic, linkages (Luna 2014).
Another alternative explanation is to prioritize mayors who occupy the same political party as legislators
because they are easier to punish if they fail to deliver votes. However, in weak party contexts, there is less
party discipline. Thus, while there can be a reputation cost associated with failure to deliver votes, it is less
likely that this reputation cost will shape the candidates’ political future. The benefit of using copartisan
mayors as brokers is even smaller where citizens are non-partisan and will not see party as a meaningful label
when deciding how to vote. Thus, the presence of a clientelist network is still the largest indicator that a
mayor can deliver votes.
These conditions for securing contracts lead to two related hypotheses. First, a national politician will be
more likely to provide club goods in municipalities with high levels of material need. Second, legislators are
more likely to provide club goods to mayors who maintain clientelist voter networks.
2Interview Conducted October 2018
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4.4 Data and Methods
In order to test where legislators will allocate club goods to attract voters, I consider the case of Colombia.
Colombia is a particularly interesting case for several reasons. First, Colombia has changed from a strong two-
party system to a multi-party system where parties have limited internal capacity since the 1991 Constitution.
This creates a system where, as one legislator in Colombia explained “the party is merely a name on a list.”3
General consensus among mayors, legislators, and bureaucrats is that political parties in Colombia have very
little power–they do not contribute to campaigns, party members do not act cohesively in the legislature,
and, as a result of the open-list proportional representation system, parties have little say on which party
candidates from the electoral lists assume office.
Second, Colombian citizens have very low levels of partisanship. Citizens are much more likely to
identify with an elected official–for example as supporters of former president Álvaro Uribe or former
president Juan Manuel Santos–than the political party to which these officials belong. Consequently, it is
difficult to identify party loyalists while campaigning. Since most parties do not use programmatic campaign
strategies, citizens will look towards other cues to determine which politicians to support.
Third, Colombia is a unitary state with high levels of administrative decentralization. At the municipal
level, mayors are responsible for local infrastructure, but they are largely dependent on central government
transfers. Municipalities have limited ability to levy taxes on citizens, so they have very little income that is
not gained through transfers from the national government. Therefore, club goods are particularly valuable
benefits. Moreover, most club goods take the form of discretional transfers–where municipalities receive
money for projects from the central government in order to pursue municipal development goals. To analyze
where club goods are provided, I consider the allocation of discretionary fiscal transfers. By focusing on
these discretionary transfers, I am able to separate club goods from the guaranteed fiscal transfers that are
used for non-excludable public goods. This allows me to narrow my analysis to only transfers that can be
politicized. In particular, the value of discretionary transfers, and the per capita transfers received from the
central government, the number of projects approved and contracted by the national government, and the
value of the projects that are approved and contracted.
Finally, in Colombia, mayors are not allowed to serve two consecutive terms. This should disincentivize
mayors from using long-term clientelist appeals because they need to wait a full term before encouraging
3Interview conducted November 2018
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voters to reelect them. In the interim, voters have limited interactions with the former mayor since these
mayors tend to spend the off-term in bureaucratic roles at the department level or as aids to legislators at the
national level.4 If a mayor hopes to run for a different political office, they must resign from their current
political post a full year before running to avoid potential conflict of interest. As a result, mayors need to trust
that voters will continue to support them despite the lag between their time as mayor and the next election.
Given these constraints, Colombia is a hard test of the theory–immediate gains from clientelism are limited
and institutional rules should limit long-term payoffs.
4.4.1 Club Goods in Colombia
One method for receiving club goods in Colombia is through royalty transfers. The royalty transfer process is
particularly compelling for the purpose of this study because it is designed to be a largely apolitical process
where royalty funds are provided to the municipalities who are best able to execute local development projects.
The money for royalty transfers is collected from municipalities with extractive economies, mostly those
with large mining industries, and is redistributed across the country into a variety of dog-eared financing
sources. Through the royalty system, there are funds for regional-level development, department-level
development, areas particularly affected by the civil conflict, and projects advancing science, technology
and innovation. A new law implemented in 2012 reformed the royalty process to allow all municipalities to
receive royalty funding, particularly through the regional and departmental funding sources. Applying for
royalties is a streamlined process: municipalities complete applications proposing a development project and
justifying how it relates to local, departmental, and national development goals. They discuss other forms
of funding they are applying for and how they plan to implement the project. The project is then reviewed
by a Collegiate Administrative and Decision Body (OCAD), who vote to determine which municipalities
receive funds. The OCAD includes votes from mayors, governors, and national ministers and is the ultimate
decision-making body for determining who receives discretionary royalty transfers. Since legislators can
attend and comment on OCAD decisions, they can influence the decision-making process even though they
cannot vote to determine which projects ultimately receive funds.
The way OCAD bodies coordinate depends on the particular region or department, but their decisions
often occur during online conferences. Decisions are made by the voting members based on the applications
4Information gained through interviews with mayors and local bureaucrats from July 2018-December 2018
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received by the OCAD. Receiving royalty funds from OCADs is quite difficult. As one mayor in the Antioquia
department explained, “You cannot count on funds from royalties and always have to think about what other
grants can help fund improvements.”5 Each department or region has autonomy in selecting which mayors,
governors, and ministers make decisions for a particular OCAD.
In interviews with departmental planning bureaucrats about OCAD decisions, they emphasized that the
intention is not to use politics to distribute benefits, but concede that it is impossible to completely omit
political considerations. Several interview subjects emphasized the importance of the governor’s preferences.
The bureaucrats who vote on behalf of governors consider the governor’s political strengths and alliances
when placing their votes. Similarly, they explain that it is possible for savvy politicians with strong ties to
ministers to use their influence to sway OCAD decisions.6. Thus, while this system is billed as the apolitical
alternative to the widely criticized “jam” system, where legislators provide investments to municipalities
“under the table”, it is an alternative venue that can be manipulated by entrepreneurial politicians who use the
existing institution to further their networks. Transparency initiatives make royalty data widely available,
making it possible to see which municipalities have projects approved, how much the projects are valued, and
how transfers are allocated across the country. In the Colombian case, therefore, focusing on projects and
transfers through the royalty process is a hard test of which municipalities receive club goods.
4.4.2 Dependent Variables
I consider club goods in the form of two different types transfers. The most transparent type of transfer occurs
through the Sistema General de Participación (SGP). This is a guaranteed transfer that all municipalities
receive. The value of the funds are determined by a formula based on the municipalities population, financial
performance, and level of need. This process is apolitical, so any effect on clientelism should be a consequence
of the relationship between clientelism and municipal demographics. I consider the logged transfers per
capita through the SGP in millions of pesos.
Second, I consider transfers through the Sistema General de Regları́as (SGR). In order to receive funds
through this process, municipalities must complete an application for a public works project that is approved
by an OCAD. I consider the transfers through the SGR by looking at the logged discretionary royalty transfers
5Interview conducted in October 2018
6Interviews conducted August 2018-November 2018
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each municipality receives, the number of projects contracted in a municipality, and the logged value of
projects that are contracted. The discretionary royalties transfers reflect the logged value of all discretionary
royalty transfers in millions of pesos. In order to focus more directly on the projects that are approved and
receive contracts, I then focus explicitly on projects approved through the OCADs. First, I consider the
number of contracted projects. This variable represents the number of projects that were both approved by an
OCAD and begin construction during a calendar year. There are three types of projects: those contracted,
those approved but not contracted, and those completed. I focus on the number of contracted projects in order
to emphasize projects have been fully cleared and are not merely a promise of future development. Then, I
look specifically at the logged value of the contracted projects. By focusing on both the number of projects
and the value of the projects, I gain additional insight into the Colombian transfers process.
4.4.3 Estimating Municipal-Level Clientelism
In order to test the effect of local clientelism on whether a municipality receives club goods, I need to
measure clientelism. Clientelism cannot be observed since the exchange of money, goods, or jobs for votes
is not documented in budgetary records or documents. However, a measure of clientelism that can identify
differences in the extent to which politicians use clientelist linkages- rather than just a dichotomous measure
of whether clientelism is present- is essential for testing how clientelism influences which municipalities
receive club goods.
The challenges in measuring clientelism have been addressed by the literature in two ways. First,
in-depth qualitative studies of clientelism have provided evidence of how clientelism occurs at the local
level, highlighting municipalities where clientelist interactions are particularly common (Abers 1998, Muñoz
2014, Ocampo 2014, Zarazaga 2014). While these types of measures are exceptionally rich, they cannot be
applied to other municipalities because of the focus on specific interactions between particular municipal
actors rather than general characteristics of the municipality and its citizens. The second way clientelism
is measured is through the use of survey list experiments designed to elicit sensitive information (Blair &
Imai 2012, Blair, Imai & Lyall 2014, Greene 2017). This measure is more broadly applicable, allowing
respondents who see a list of potential activities to reveal how many–as opposed to which–activities apply to
them. This measure minimizes concerns about under-reporting due to desirability bias, but it is difficult to
scale-down to the local level because it requires a high number of respondents. Finding the necessary sample
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size is a particularly difficult task in small rural municipalities where theories suggest clientelism is most
likely to happen (Gingerich & Medina 2013).
In order to overcome these challenges, I create a new, original measure of clientelism that can identify
municipal-level differences without limiting the analysis to municipalities where field work can be conducted
or conducting large-scale surveys that may drop many small municipalities from the analysis. To do so, I
focus on patronage–a particular form of clientelism where jobs are exchanged for political support–to estimate
the level of clientelism more broadly. Interviews with bureaucrats throughout Colombia identify patronage as
one of the most common forms of clientelism at the municipal level. As one mayoral assistant in the Valle de
Cauca department explains “bureaucratic jobs are given based on political support.”7 Other interview subjects
emphasize the importance of temporary jobs in clientelist interactions arguing that when there are jobs that
need to be filled–but cannot yet be filled through slow bureaucratic channels–mayors can fill temporary
vacancies with people who will support the local government. Unlike direct gifts of cash or material goods,
patronage is possible in even the poorest municipalities. Since patronage is a long-term clientelist strategy
that involves iterative interactions, I expect that municipalities with high levels of patronage demonstrate a
substantial investment in building clientelist networks and are more likely to use other clientelist strategies.
Much like clientelism, patronage cannot be directly observed. Local records will never explicitly indicate
that an employee was hired because they are a “friend of the government” or that an employee is paid for a
job that doesn’t actually exist. However, unlike clientelism writ large, patronage can be estimated based on
available data that identifies who public employees are, what jobs they are hired to perform, and their basic
qualifications. The method I use to translate this information about public employees into a widely applicable
and nuanced measure of municipal-level clientelism is a Bayesian Mixed-Membership model.
I use a Bayesian Mixed-Membership model in order to estimate to what extent public hires are selected
for political gain. The intuition is simple: Each individual is nested in a municipality and can be hired
for a public job based on their qualifications or for clientelist motivations. While one single observable
characteristic of a public service employee cannot determine whether or not clientelism played a role in the
decision to hire that candidate, the combination of characteristics of each employee provides a full picture of
why that candidate may have been chosen to fill a public position. With each additional new employee in
a municipality, patterns begin to emerge that suggest certain characteristics occur more often than others.
7Interview conducted July 2016
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Ultimately, this makes it possible to estimate to what extent candidates are hired for political–rather than
meritocratic–reasons. For example, an employee who is educated for the subject they are teaching, paid
through national transfers for education spending, receives a small bonus, and is stationed in a single school is
likely to be hired for different reasons than the employee who is not educated for the class they are teaching,
paid through a municipality’s private funds, receives a small bonus, and is in a “floating” position between
schools. In this example, the latter candidate is more likely to have received the position for political reasons.
As we see more public employees whose profile mirrors the second example, rather than the first, it suggests
the municipality is using more patronage-based hiring practices than meritocratic hiring practices. Using
a similar logic to topic models, where patterns in words suggest what topic a text speaks to (GrGross &
Manrique-Vallier 2014), in the mixed membership model patterns in employee characteristics suggest to
what extent the employee may have received their job for political gain.
I analyze two classes of hires, which I call the “meritocratic” class and the “patronage” class. In the
meritocratic class, hiring decisions are based on (1) whether the municipality has a position to fill and (2)
whether the candidate is qualified to fill the position. We would expect meritocratic hiring decisions to be
made when these two conditions are met. In the “patronage” class, decisions are made based on whether
the hire is politically advantageous. This can occur when a position is created solely to fill it with an ally or
when the candidate is under-qualified for the position. Of course, some candidates have the distinct advantage
of filling both roles: they may be filling a newly created position and be qualified to fill this new, albeit
unnecessary, opening. Mixed membership allows candidates to be both qualified and political.
In Bayesian inference, the posterior distribution used for inference is proportional to the product of some
likelihood function using data and prior expectations based on outside information. In order to estimate the
use of clientelism, my likelihood function depends on data about the observed characteristics of the public
service employees conditioned on prior information about the municipality where these employees work.
At the individual level, I use data on teacher hires. I use a series of dummy variables that highlight
features of both the job filled and the employee themselves. I isolate several indicators associated with
clientelism: the employee’s qualifications (if their education matches the job they receive), whether they
are stationed in a rural or urban area within the municipality, how they are paid, what type of position they
fill, how fixed their position is (are they in a classroom or is it a floating position), whether they received a
bonus, and whether they belong to a particular ethnic group. These characteristics should occur at different
rates depending on if the teacher is hired for meritocratic or political reasons. For example, a teacher who is
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educated for the subject they are teaching is much less likely to reflect patronage than one whose education is
not aligned with the position they were hired to fill. I create a total count of how frequently each trait occurs
in any given municipality. I posit that these features of employees are characterized by a mixture of binomial
distributions. Using this mixture, I am able to predict the probability that each characteristic is observed in a
world where all hires are patronage-based versus one where all hires are meritocratic.
Next, I condition these estimates for how often hires tend to correspond with the patronage class using
prior information about each municipality. I focus on three indicators that can affect to what extent hires
are likely to be clientelist: household enrollment in social programs (as a measure of need), population
(clientelism tends to occur more often in smaller municipalities), and a fiscal responsibility indicator (reflecting
how efficient municipalities are with their funds). This conditions the information about each employee on
the municipality where he is employed.
The posterior distribution after multiplying the likelihood function and the prior information is a mixture
of binomial distributions representing the likelihood of the observed patterns of hires occurring in the
patronage or meritocratic classes. In order to determine these parameters, I estimate a parameter πm, that
estimates the extent to which hiring decisions are meritocratic. In order to estimate to what extent hiring
decisions are based on patronage, I simply calculate 1−πm. Since the measure focuses on how often different
attributes occur, it can use the similarities between employees to determine to what extent public sector
employees, on average, are political rather than meritocratic.
The full model can be characterized as follows:
Ymj |θ, Z ∼ f(ymj |θj , zmj)∀m, j (4.1)
θ ∼ β(1, 1) (4.2)
zij |π, n ∼ Binomial(πm)∀m, j (4.3)
πm|n ∼ Beta(µi, φ)∀m (4.4)
φ ∼ Gamma(2, 2) (4.5)
µm|γ = Logit−1(Aγm)∀m (4.6)
γ ∼ N(0, 10) (4.7)
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Where:
m = The municipal indicator
j = The indicator for each observed characteristic of public employees
n = The number of temporary hires within the municipality
ymj = The profile of indicators j in municipality m
θ = Parameter for generating distribution for indicator j
Z = Indicator for if observed characteristic j is a manifestation of patronage
π = The proportion of hires that indicate patronage
µ = The expectation of clientelism in each municipality
γ = Coefficients for municipal indicators
A = The matrix of demographic information for each municipality
This model is generalizable and can be used to estimate rates of patronage in any municipality where
data on public hires is available. While I focus specifically on teacher hires, my empirical strategy can be
applied to bureaucrats, post office employees, or any type of public sector worker. In Colombia, teacher
positions are some of the most common public service positions that become available annually in both
urban and rural municipalities. Due to the slow nature of the civil service system, municipalities rely on
temporary hires, in addition to permanent hires, to fill positions of classroom instructors, education directors,
and guidance counselors. Through the civil service, teachers need to receive special training to ensure that
these educators are qualified. However, in temporary hires the requirements are quite lax, giving the local
government discretion over who fills these positions. Focusing on teacher hires creates distance from the
funds that mayors can receive through royalty transfers since the salaries of teachers are predominantly
funded through guaranteed fiscal transfers that are dog-eared for health and education. Teachers, therefore,
can be recipients of patronage that is separate from the royalty transfer process.
The estimates of patronage at the municipal-level should provide a strong measure of relative levels of
clientelism across municipalities. A map of Colombia, where darker red indicates higher levels of clientelism
at the municipal level, can be seen in Figure 4.1. Gray municipalities reflect missing data, which occurs in
Southern and Eastern Colombia where, due to small populations, divisions are classified as corregimientos
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rather than municipalities that do not report equivalent demographic information and in municipalities where
no temporary teachers were hired or data is missing on municipal-level characteristics.
I validate this measure using survey data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project in 2012-2014.
I find that respondents in municipalities with higher estimates for clientelism are more likely to respond
that their government is doing nothing to combat corruption and more likely to respond that corruption is
widespread. I use ordered logit regressions where the dependent variable is the citizen’s responses to the
survey questions and the independent variable is my estimate of clientelism in that respondent’s municipality.
In both cases, my measure of clientelism is statistically significant in the expected direction.8
4.4.4 Independent Variables
Other independent variables central to the analysis are the proportion of the population who have valid
SISBEN records as a measure of need within the municipality. SISBEN is a system in Colombia for
identifying vulnerable populations who receive additional social assistance. Thus, the proportion of the
population who have valid records reflects how much need there is inside the municipality. In order to
calculate the SISBEN measure, I divide the number of valid SISBEN records in each municipality by the
total population in that municipality.
I also control for two key alternative explanations. First, I test if transfers are instead allocated to popular
mayors. In order to measure this, I calculate the margin of victory using the difference in the percent of
the vote received by the winning mayor and the second-place candidate. If transfers were a product of the
mayor’s popularity, I would expect mayors with a larger margin of victory to receive more transfers. Second,
I test if the transfers favor copartisans. In order to do this, I create a dummy variable for Partido de la U,
the party of the president and the majority party in Congress from 2012-2015. I assign a value of one if the
mayor serving from 2012-2015 is from Partido de la U and zero otherwise. This measurement captures the
idea that transfers favor the current ruling party.
Finally, I consider less popular alternative explanations. If the allocation of funds were meritocratic,
rather than a form of clientelism, I would expect that municipalities that are better at managing their finances
would receive more fiscal transfers. Thus, I control for the government-assigned fiscal responsibility score.
In more meritocratic systems, I would expect higher scores on fiscal responsibility to correlate with more








Figure 4.1: Estimate of Clientelism in Each Colombian Municipality
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discretionary transfers. A similar indicator of meritocracy could be whether the municipalities receiving club
goods are urban or rural. In general, I would expect rural municipalities to have higher levels of need. Thus, I
would expect more rural municipalities to receive more club goods, even controlling for need and clientelism.
Finally, I consider the case where more transparent municipalities are more likely to receive additional
funds. In order to do this, I control for an indicator for local government openness. If the OCAD was
making decisions solely based on which municipalities requesting funds were likely to use them responsibly,
I would expect municipalities with higher openness scores to receive more discretionary transfers. The
local government openness indicator is collected by the Colombian government and considers municipal
transparency where higher levels reflect more transparent municipalities. Unlike the clientelism variable, this
variable focuses on the procedures the municipality follows rather than potential corruption or clientelism.
Openness and clientelism have a small Pearson’s correlation coefficient of -0.079, alleviating concerns about
possible colinearity. In fitting the model, I include the total population of the municipality and year fixed
effects.
4.4.5 Methods
I test my hypotheses using data from 2012, when the rules governing royalty transfers in Colombia changed
to open transfers to all municipalities, through 2015. This time period covers one mayoral term. I estimate
clientelism in 2013, halfway through each mayors term. I test the hypotheses that municipalities with high
levels of need and municipalities with high levels of clientelism are more likely to receive club goods. I
conduct my analysis using two categories of transfers.
First, I consider transfers where the allocation process is most transparent. High transparency transfers
occur through the Sistema General de Participación (SGP). These transfers are guaranteed to all municipalities
and the value of the transfers are determined using a formula. I use ordinary least squared regression where
the dependent variable is the logged value of SGP transfers.
Next, I test my hypothesis through analyzing medium-transparency transfers through the Sistema General
de Regları́as (SGR). I do this using logged discretionary royalty transfers, logged value of contracted projects,
and number of projects contracted. When considering royalty transfers per capita and the value of contracted
projects, I use ordinary least squares regression to estimate the linear relationship between each independent
variable and royalties transfers. When considering the number of contracted projects, I use a zero-inflated
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poisson model to account for the reality that most municipalities do not receive any projects while very few
municipalities will receive more than one project.
4.5 Results and Analysis
4.5.1 High Transparency Transfers: Guaranteed SGP Transfers
First, I test whether clientelism has an effect on transfers that are calculated through the SGP system. These
transfers are entirely determined by a formula that considers population, need, and past fiscal performance
of a municipality. There is no negotiation process in determining the amount transferred or the amount of
autonomy that municipalities have over these funds. I model the total transfers received through the SGP
system using an ordinary least squares regression. Clientelism should have a minimal effect on these transfers:
while it should not influence the amount of funds a municipality receives, the factors that are most important
for the formula are also factors that help predict clientelism in any given municipality. The full results of this
model can be found in Table 4.1.
Given that the analysis is conducted using ordinary least squares regression, the coefficients can be
interpreted as the change in the logged value of guaranteed transfers given a one unit increase in the
independent variable. I find that both municipal clientelism and municipal need, measured as the proportion
of citizens with valid SISBEN records, are positive and statistically significant. I expect that municipal
need should be a substantial indicator of receiving formulaic transfers since they are designed to help the
municipalities who most need funds. However, I find that clientelism is also positive and significant. Given
that both of these variables are measured continuously from 0 to 1, I compare the effect size directly and find
that the effect of need is more than double the effect of clientelism. Moreover, estimates of clientelism may
also contribute to this estimate because clientelism is more likely to be observed in municipalities with higher
levels of need.
4.5.2 Medium Transparency Transfers: Royalties through SGR
Next, I consider transfers through the SGR process. While these transfers are not intended to be political, the
voting process for determining whose projects are approved requires votes from municipal, departmental,
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Fiscal Performance Index −0.013∗∗∗
(0.001)
Open Government Index −0.002∗∗
(0.001)
Member of Presidents Party −0.024
(0.018)














∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 4.1: Guaranteed Transfers
and the national government. Thus, I expect that municipal-level clientelism should have a positive and
significant effect on funds receives through the SGR.
4.5.3 Discretionary Royalty Transfers
Royalty transfers are designed to be based on merit: municipalities apply with projects and a committee
approves whether or not they receive the funding. They are difficult to get, and designed to be a largely
apolitical process based on how the project aligns with national development goals and the municipality’s
ability to enact the project. However, as interview subjects suggested, having strong relationships with
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legislators who deliver goods to the municipality can help increase the likelihood of receiving these transfers
because they can advise mayors of the best way to frame their applications. Furthermore, legislators may
be invited to attend meetings to approve royalty allocations and can advocate for particular projects. As a
result, this is a hard test of the theory: evidence that clientelism matters in these transfers suggests political










Fiscal Performance Index 0.054∗∗∗
(0.007)
Open Government Index −0.020∗∗∗
(0.005)
Member of Presidents Party 0.162
(0.101)














∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 4.2: Royalty Transfers
Unlike in the guaranteed transfers through the SGP system, in the SGR system municipal need has a
negative statistically significant effect at the p < 0.05 level. This is particularly noteworthy since these
royalty projects are designed to be largely need-based, but municipalities with higher levels of need seem to
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receive fewer royalties. Second, I find that clientelism has a positive and statistically significant effect. Unlike
in the SGP system, this effect has a greater magnitude than the effect of need and is positively correlate with
receiving more royalties transfers. When a mayor has a local clientelist network, they are better positioned to
receive additional fiscal transfers.
In this test of the theory, I find support for the idea that when a mayor can act as a potential broker,
they are more likely to receive club goods. Furthermore, the mayor’s popularity and being a member of
the majority party have no effect. Of the mayoral attributes that can facilitate access to central government
resources, only the presence of clientelism has an effect. As seen in Figure 4.2, the log of discretionary



















Figure 4.2: Discretionary Royalty Transfers
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4.5.4 Approved Contracts
Next, I focus exclusively on the projects that were approved and received contracts in each municipality. I
measure these in two ways: the number of projects that are approved and the value of these projects, in order
to better isolate SGR transfers that can be used as club goods.
Number of Contracts
When testing how many contracted projects a municipality receives, I argue that municipalities with higher
levels of clientelism will receive more contracts. I model the likelihood of receiving a contract using a
zero-inflated poisson regression. The full results of this model can be found in Table 4.39.
I find that the coefficient on the level of municipal need is negative. This suggests that, all else equal,
contracts are given to municipalities with lower levels of need, running counter to the hypothesis.
I again find that clientelism is positive and statistically significant. This suggests that when municipalities
have higher levels of clientelism, they are likely to receive more contracts. This further supports the hypothesis
that legislators are more likely to provide club goods to municipalities where the mayor can act as brokers.
When mayors build clientelist networks, they can more reliably deliver votes and are more desirable to national
legislators. The expected number of contracts across levels of clientelism, with bootstrapped confidence
intervals, can be found in Figure 4.3.
When considering the alternative hypotheses, I find that there is no statistically significant result for being
in the same party as the President. While there are positive and statistically significant results for both the
fiscal performance index and the mayor’s popularity, these results have smaller effect sizes than clientelism.
Furthermore, more transparent municipalities actually receive fewer contracts, all else equal.
These results provide interesting insight for the distribution of club goods. Regardless of need and other
standard municipal characteristics, evidence of clientelist networks does, in fact, increase the number of
contracts that municipalities receive. Holding all other municipality and mayoral characteristics equal, a
municipality with higher levels of clientelism is also better able to secure these projects.
Notably, this effect holds regardless of the mayor’s political party. There is no clear benefit for mayors
who are copartisans when determining who receives funds for projects. This is important for considering


































Fiscal Performance Index 0.035∗∗∗
(0.008)
Open Government Index −0.014∗∗∗
(0.005)
Member of Presidents Party 0.072
(0.116)













∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 4.3: Number of Projects
the effect of clientelism: being a clientelist mayor matters, but the political party label does not facilitate
improved access to funds.
Value of Contracts
Finally, I consider the value of projects for each municipality. Since it is rare for a municipality to receive more
than one contract, considering the value of the contracts received by the six-hundred fifty-one municipalities
that did have a project approved and contracted between 2012 and 2015 allows me to better isolate whether
clientelism municipalities receive larger projects for their municipality, on average. If my hypotheses are
supported, I expect that municipalities with higher levels of need and municipalities with higher levels of
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Fiscal Performance Index 0.032∗∗∗
(0.009)
Open Government Index −0.002
(0.007)
Member of Presidents Party 0.357∗∗
(0.147)














∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 4.4: Value of Contracts
Once again, I do not find support for the hypothesis that municipalities with higher levels of need will
receive more valuable contracts. Instead, I find that, all else equal, municipalities with more need will receive
less expensive contracts. In part, this may be because these municipalities have more needs, so the projects
that are approved tend to be more less expensive and still aid the municipality.
However, I continue to find support for the hypothesis that municipalities where mayors have built larger
clientelist networks are more likely to receive valuable projects, as seen in Figure 4.4. In fact, clientelism
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has the largest effect size of the three independent variables positively correlated with the size of a contract–
clientelism has a larger effect than fiscal responsibility or being a member of the president’s political party.























Figure 4.4: Value of Awarded Contracts
Together, the distribution of funds through the SGR process provide support to the hypothesis that
municipalities where mayors have a proven capacity to act as brokers are more likely to receive additional
transfers from the central government. The budget available through royalties is limited, but municipalities
where mayors have built larger patronage networks tend to receive more discretionary transfers, more
contracted projects, and the projects they receive are more valuable. This holds regardless of political party
and the mayor’s popularity in their municipality.
Need, however, has a much less consistent effect. When focusing on transfers through the SGR process,
need is negatively associated with the amount of transfers received, number of contracts, and value of
contracts. This is noteworthy because it suggests that these transfers are not purely based on need– while
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higher need municipalities may also require fewer funds to have an effect, the reduced likelihood of receiving
a contract shows that the system does not necessarily direct projects to the highest-need areas of the country.
A meritocratic explanation for royalty transfers also provides limited support. In all three measures of
transfers through the SGR system, fiscal performance is a positive and statistically significant. However, the
effect size of this indicator is smaller than the effect of clientelism. Moreover, there is a negative relationship
between open governments and receiving funds for both the total discretionary transfers and the number of
contracts.
4.6 Conclusion
This analysis provides several key insights about how goods are distributed in weak party systems. If
clientelism in weak party systems favors a movement towards club goods, then my analysis suggests that the
importance of clientelism is two-fold. First, legislators are more likely to provide club goods to municipalities
with preexisting clientelist networks. Second, and even more important, mayors will continue to use
clientelism at the local level, perhaps to signal that they are reliable brokers for the legislator to use. While
mayors do not advertise their clientelist networks, in Colombia many areas have rich historical clientelist
legacies and politicians have clear, well-established, personal networks. Legislators, many of whom once
served in more local-level positions, can identify central actors in their departments who control clientelist
networks. For the mayors, continuing to pursue clientelist strategies is a way to bring necessary goods into
the municipality.
In Colombia, mayors cannot serve two consecutive terms. In the short term, this may disincentivize the
use of clientelism. Without the opportunity for reelection, a clientelist mayor needs to believe that their voters
will continue to be loyal to the clientelist exchange on a longer time horizon. However, if clientelism is a cost
that allows mayors to bring additional funds into their municipality and strengthen relationships with national
legislators, using clientelism offers new benefits beyond building voter networks. Furthermore, these benefits
might explain why local-level clientelism persists.
Early work on clientelism highlights the crucial role that mayors can play (Valenzuela 1977). However,
as the study of clientelism has increasingly moved towards party brokers and how clientelism persists
alongside programmatic campaigns, analysis of mayors has decreased in favor of considering what actors
politicians will choose as brokers instead of local politicians. This has highlighted the risks of selecting
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another politician: competing interests mean that mayors may not always be willing to attribute credit to
legislators. Particularly when the clientelist benefit is a club good, a mayor has a benefit for allowing citizens
believe it was the mayor that helped bring goods into the municipality. In this analysis, I show that the
mayor’s characteristics–and ability to deliver votes–still continues to affect the distribution of particularistic
benefits. Where political parties are weak and all citizens are potential swing voters, a mayor who can use
their position in the community to deliver voters is still important.
From my analysis, the support for the hypothesis that clientelist mayors have increased access to central
government resources provides potential insight as to why we see such unequal distribution in access to
public goods. Mayors who are best equipped to manipulate the system–either from their ability to manage
local funds and, perhaps more notably, their ability to create reciprocal clientelist networks– are more likely
to receive goods. This creates self-perpetuating networks since those mayors can continue to benefit while
others struggle to bring extra funds into their municipalities.
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APPENDIX A: APPENDICES: WHEN DO CLUB GOODS BUY VOTES? MAYORAL COOPERA-
TION IN CLIENTELIST EXCHANGES
A.1 Full Model Solution
Parameters
Parameter Definition Range of Values
k Size of the benefit provided ∈ [0, 1]
σ Additional benefit of receiving credit > 0
α Reputation benefit as fraction of k ∈ (0, 1)
c Cost of sending a network building signal > 0
Ic Indicator for receiving credit {0, 1}
Is Indicator for if clientelist signal sent {0, 1}
N Subscript referring to the national government
L Subscript referring to a low value
H Subscript referring to a high value
Table A.1: Model Parameters
Utility Functions
Legislator: UN = k(IcσN − 1)
Mayor: U = k(Icσ + α)− Ic − Is
For the ambitious mayor, they value their reputation with the national government, so they have αH while
the not ambitious mayor has αL. This means that the ambitious mayor will a higher payoff for attributing
credit than the not ambitious mayor.
The ambitious mayor is less focused with their local reputation, so if they claim credit, they receive σL
while the not ambitious mayor receives σH .
Legislator Strategy Mayor Strategy Legislator Payoff Ambitious Not Ambitious
Mayor Payoff Mayor Payoff
k ∈ [0, 1] Attribute credit k(σN − 1) kαH − Isc kαL − Isc
k ∈ [0, 1] Claim Credit −k k(σL + αH)− 1− Isc k(σH + αL)− 1− Is c
Table A.2: Payoffs
A.1.1 Stage 3: Mayor Attributes Credit
The mayor will attribute if:




This means that the ambitious mayor will attribute credit when k ≤ 1σL and the not ambitious mayor
will attribute credit when k ≤ 1σH . The not ambitious mayor will attribute credit for larger projects than the
ambitious mayor. If σ < 1 a mayor will attribute for any sized project, but if σ > 1 they will attribute for
some k.
A.1.2 Stage 2: The Legislator Determines Whether to Provide the Benefit, k
The legislator will always provide the benefit if they know that they will receive credit. So, the legislator will
provide the benefit if k ≤ 1σH . The legislator will never provide the benefit if they will not receive credit. So,
they will never provide the benefit if k > 1σL .
If the benefit k ∈ ( 1σH ,
1
σL
], whether the legislator provides the benefit is a function of their belief, µ, that
the mayor is ambitious. The legislator will provide the benefit if:
µ(k(σN − 1)) + (1− µ)(−k) ≥ 0
µkσN − k ≥ 0
µσN − 1 ≥ 0
µ ≥ 1
σN
The legislator will never provide the benefit if σN ≤ 1.
A.1.3 Stage 1: The Mayor Decides whether to send the Clientelist Signal
All else equal, a mayor will never send the clientelist signal in order to receive the same payoff without the
additional cost.
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A.1.4 Best Responses and Equilibrium
The legislator has several best responses that need to be checked based on the size of the benefit, k, and the
legislator’s beliefs, µ.
The mayors best responses are to:
1. k ≤ 1σH , the best response is always to provide k if σN > 1
2. k > 1σL , the best response is never to provide k
3. k ∈ ( 1σH ,
1
σL
] the best response is to provide k if µ ≥ 1σN
Since the beliefs are irrelevant for best responses if k ≤ 1σH or k >
1
σL
, the interesting range to study




Let µs = the belief that the mayor who sends a clientelist signal is ambitious and µ = the belief that
the mayor who does not send the clientelist signal is ambitious. The probability that a mayor is ambitious is
simply p. This leads to 5 conditions to check:
1. σN ≤ 1
2. µs < 1σN and µ <
1
σN
3. µs ≥ 1σN and µ ≥
1
σN
4. µs < 1σN and µ ≥
1
σN
5. µs ≥ 1σN and µ <
1
σN
A.1.4.1 Case 1: σN ≤ 1
In this condition, regardless of k, the best response of the legislator is to not provide the good. Neither type of
mayor will send the signal in order to avoid paying the cost, c. There is an equilibrium where no mayor sends
a signal and the legislator never provides the benefit.
A.1.4.2 Case 2: µs = µ < 1σN
In this condition, the legislator will not provide the benefit regardless of the signal. Neither type of mayor
will send the signal in order to avoid paying the cost, c.
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If p < 1σN there is an equilibrium where neither mayor sends a signal and the legislator never provides
the benefit k. µs < 1σN and µ = p.
A.1.4.3 Case 3: µs = µ ≥ 1σN
In this condition, the legislator’s best response is to provide the benefit regardless of the signal. Since they
will receive the benefit, neither type of mayor will pay the cost, c, of sending the signal.










If p ≥ 1σN there is an equilibrium where neither mayor sends a signal and the legislator provides the
benefit k ∈ ( 1σH ,
1
σL
]. The ambitious mayor will attribute credit and the not ambitious mayor will claim
credit. µs ≥ 1σN and µ = p.
A.1.4.4 Case 4: µs < 1σN and µ ≥
1
σN
In this condition, the legislator’s best response is to not provide a benefit if they observe the clientelist signal
and to provide the benefit if they do not observe the clientelist signal.
If the ambitious mayor sends the signal, they receive −c and if they do not send the signal, they receive
kαH . The ambitious mayor will never send the clientelist signal.
If the not ambitious mayor sends the signal, they receive −c and if they do not send the signal, they
receive k(σH + αL)− 1. The not ambitious mayor will never send the clientelist signal.









If p ≥ 1σN then there is a pooling equilibrium where neither mayor sends a signal and the legislator
provides the benefit k ∈ ( 1σH ,
1
σL
] when they do not observe the signal and do not provide the benefit when
they observe the signal. The ambitious mayor will attribute credit and the not ambitious mayor will claim
credit. µs < 1σN and µ = p.
A.1.5 Case 5: µs ≥ 1σN and µ <
1
σN
In his condition, the legislator’s best response is to provide the benefit if they observe the clientelist signal
and not to provide the benefit if they do not observe the clientelist signal.
76
If the ambitious mayor sends the signal, they receive kαH − c and if they do not send the signal they will
receive 0. The ambitious mayor will send the signal as long c ≤ kαH . Given the possible range of values, k,
the ambitious mayor will always send the signal if c < αHσL .
If the not ambitious mayor sends the signal, they receive k(σH +αL)− 1− c and if they do not send the
signal they will receive 0. The not ambitious mayor will send the signal as long as c ≤ k(σH + αL) − 1.
Given the possible range of values, k, the not ambitious mayor will always send the signal if c < αL+σH−σLσL .
If αH − αL > σH − 1k the ambitious mayor will pay a higher cost of clientelism.
If both mayors are willing to pay the cost of clientelism, c ≤ kαH and c ≤ k(σH + αL)− 1








= All Beliefs Consistent
If p ≥ 1σN there exists a pooling equilibrium where both types of mayors send the clientelist signal. The
legislator will provide the benefit if they observe the signal and will not provide the benefit if they do not
observe the signal. The ambitious mayor attributes credit and the not ambitious mayor claims credit. µs = p
and µ < 1σN
If the ambitious mayor pays the cost of clientelism and the not ambitious mayor does not αH −
αL > σH − 1k , c ≤ kαH and c > k(σH + αL)− 1










These beliefs are consistent. So, if αH − αL > σH − 1k , c < kαH , and c > k(σH + αL) − 1 there
is a separating equilibrium where the ambitious mayor sends the clientelist signal and the not ambitious
mayor does not. The legislator will provide the good if they observe the clientelist signal and will not provide
the good if they do not observe the clientelist signal. The ambitious mayor will attribute credit and the not
ambitious credit would claim credit if they sent the signal. µs = 1 and µ = 0.
If the ambitious mayor does not pay the cost of clientelism and the not ambitious mayor pays the
cost clientelism, αH − αL < σH − 1k , c > kαH and c ≤ k(σH + αL)− 1





These beliefs are not consistent and there is no equilibrium.
If neither mayor pays the cost of clientelism,c > kαH and c > k(σH + αL)− 1










If p < 1σN there is a pooling equilibrium where neither mayor sends the clientelist signal, the legislator
will provide the benefit if they observe the signal and will not provide the benefit if they do not observe the
benefit, and the mayor would attribute credit if they received the benefit while the not ambitious mayor would
claim credit if they received the benefit. µs ≥ 1σN and µ = p.
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APPENDIX B: APPENDICES: MEASURING LOCAL-LEVEL CLIENTELISM: A BAYESIAN MIXED-
MEMBERSHIP APPROACH
B.1 Regression Results for Validity Checks








∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table B.1: To what extent does the government combat corruption?








∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table B.2: How widespread is corruption in public officials?
B.2 Results for Model Application








∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table B.3: To what extent do you trust your mayor?
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Figure B.1: Patronage Map with Imputations
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APPENDIX C: APPENDICES:CLUB GOODS PROVISION: THE EFFECT OF WEAK PARTIES
ON CLIENTELISM STRATEGIES
C.1 Validity Check Regressions and Graphs








∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1


















Does Nothing Does Some
Does a Lot
Figure C.1: Predicted Probability of Response to Question “To what extent does the government combat
corruption?”








∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1


















Not Widespread Not Very Widespread
Somewhat Widespread Very Widespread
Figure C.2: Predicted Probability of Response to Question “How widespread is corruption?”
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Municipal Clientelism 2.584∗∗∗ 2.732∗∗∗
(0.487) (0.631)
Proportion valid SISBEN −2.860∗∗∗ −2.841∗∗∗
(0.777) (0.984)
Proportion Rural −0.949∗∗∗ −0.996∗∗∗
(0.187) (0.241)
Fiscal Performance Index 0.040∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.009)
Open Government Index −0.017∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006)
Member of Presidents Party 0.115 0.091
(0.102) (0.130)










Log Likelihood −1333.565 −1253.705
Deviance 1873.899 1168.091
Num. obs. 3744 3744
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table C.3: Non Zero-Inflated Models
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C.2.2 Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial
Negative Binomial








Fiscal Performance Index 0.041∗∗∗
(0.009)
Open Government Index −0.019∗∗∗
(0.006)
Member of President’s Party 0.091
(0.130)















∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table C.4: Negative Binomial Specifications
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C.2.3 Zero-Inflated Models with Municipal Demographics in the Logit Component
Zero-Inflated Poisson Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial
Count Model: Intercept −1.078∗∗∗ −1.485∗∗∗
(0.351) (0.392)
Municipal Clientelism 2.628∗∗∗ 2.737∗∗∗
(0.569) (0.631)
Proportion valid SISBEN −1.782∗∗ −2.013∗∗
(0.829) (0.920)
Member of President’s Party 0.080 0.098
(0.120) (0.130)
Mayor Election Competitiveness 0.009∗∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.004) (0.005)
Zero Model:Intercept 20.251 19.905
(532.923) (480.832)
Proportion Rural 1.059∗∗∗ 1.370∗∗∗
(0.335) (0.466)
Fiscal Performance Indicator −0.060∗∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.016)











Log Likelihood −1282.250 −1270.166
Num. obs. 3744 3744
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table C.5: Zero-Inflated Models with Municipal Indicators
C.3 Summary Statistics of All Variables
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Variable Minimum Mean Median Standard Deviation Maximum
Logged SGP per Capita 0.00 13.26 13.28 0.54 15.73
Logged Discretionary Royalty Transfers 0.00 5.74 6.55 2.91 12.50
Number of Contracted Projects 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.51 7.00
Value of Contracted Projects 14.29 21.51 21.63 1.70 25.56
Table C.6: Summary Statistics for all Dependent Variables
Variable Minimum Mean Median Standard Deviation Maximum
Municipal Clientelism 0.158 0.363 0.347 0.089 0.662
Proportion Valid SISBEN 0.001 0.231 0.234 0.058 0.540
Proportion Rural 0.001 0.547 0.583 0.242 0.983
Fiscal Performance Index 18.250 68.600 68.450 7.776 91.750
Open Government Index 20.930 67.680 68.970 10.442 94.510
Member of Presidents Party 0.000 0.247 0.000 0.431 1.000
Mayor Election Competitiveness 0.030 14.210 11.090 12.062 85.760
Population 976 37859 13417 135654.2 2464322
Table C.7: Summary Statistics for all Independent Variables
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Reglas de la Competencia Electoral sobre Nacionalización del Sistema de Partidos: Las Estrategias de
los Actores Polı́ticos en Antioquia, 1997-2011.” Colombia Internacional (85).
Blair, Graeme & Kosuke Imai. 2012. “Statistical Analysis of List Experiments.” Political Analysis 20(1):47–
77.
Blair, Graeme, Kosuke Imai & Jason Lyall. 2014. “Comparing and Combining List and Endorsement
Experiments: Evidence from Afghanistan.” American Journal of Political Science .
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